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INTRODUCTION
On October  15,  2005,  nearly ten million Iraqis  cast ballots in  a national
referendum  on a new  constitution.  The  charter had  been prepared  in the
wake  of  the  American-led  campaign  to  depose  Saddam  Hussein  from
power,  and  in  the  midst  of  a  raging  insurgency.  The  final  draft  was
extremely  controversial,  especially  with  the  minority  Sunni  Arab
community,  which  feared  that  the  draft's  version  of  federalism  would
threaten  the  unity  of  Iraq.  Over  widespread  Sunni  opposition  in  the
referendum,  however,  the constitution  won  the  approval  of over  seventy-
eight percent  of Iraqi  voters nationwide.  It  entered into effect two months
later, with the election of a new National Assembly under its auspices.'
* A version of this article will be published  in Islam  and Constitutionalism (Sohail  Hashimi
& Houchang Chehabi eds., forthcoming  2007).
** Noah Feldman  is Professor of Law at New York University School of Law.  He  served as
senior  constitutional  advisor to the Coalition  Provisional Authority  in Iraq  (Apr. 2003-July
2003),  and as a pro bono advisor to members of the drafting committee for  the Transitional
Administrative  Law  (Nov.  2003-Mar.  2004).  A.B.  in  Near  Eastern  Languages  and
Civilizations,  Harvard  University,  1992;  D.Phil.  in  Islamic  Thought,  Oxford  University,
1994; J.D., Yale Law School,  1997.
*** Roman  Martinez  is  a  J.D. candidate  in the  Class  of 2008  at  Yale  Law  School.  He
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Iraq  in  Baghdad  (July  2005-August  2005),  as  Director  for  Iraq  at  the  National  Security
Council  at  the  White  House  (June  2004-August  2005),  and  as  a  political  advisor  to  the
Coalition  Provisional  Authority  (CPA)  in  Iraq  (May  2003-June  2004).  A.B.  in  History,
Harvard  University,  2001;  M.Phil  in  International  Relations,  Cambridge  University,  2002.
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essay.  The views  expressed  in  this  essay are,  of course,  those  of the  authors,  not of the
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1.  Dexter Filkins, Iraqis,  Including Sunnis, Vote  in Large Numbers on Calm Day, N.Y.
Times, Dec.  16, 2005,  at Al.FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
For all the conflict  surrounding its preparation,  Iraq's new constitution  is
a document of substantial  historical significance.  Although  it was prepared
while U.S.  troops  remained in  the country, democratic  principles  governed
the process by which  it was  written  (by a directly  elected Parliament)  and
approved  (by  a  national  referendum).  Such  principles  also  figure
prominently in the charter's substantive provisions.  Largely because of the
democratic  character  of  the  drafting  and  ratification  process,  the
constitution also reflects the strongly Islamic  character of Iraqi electoral  and
grass-roots politics  in the post-invasion period.  Indeed,  it is  fair to say that
the  charter  self-consciously  aims  to  integrate  Islamic  values  into  the
country's political  life while retaining the separation of powers,  checks and
balances,  and human-rights  guarantees  that  are the hallmark of secular and
democratic  constitutions around the world.
This  essay  seeks  to  examine  the  role  of Islam  and  Islamic  politics  in
Iraq's  emerging constitutional  order.  Focusing on the question  of Islam in
particular,  it  provides  the  most  detailed  account  of the  drafting  process
published  to date.  It also advances  three major structural-historical  claims
that have not been acknowledged in the growing literature on the topic.  The
first is  that the  earliest  origins of the  Iraqi  constitution  of 2005  are  to  be
found  in  the Iraqi  opposition  politics  that took place  in the  decade-and-a-
half beginning  in  the  early  1990s.  In  this period,  a core  group  of Iraqis,
most of whom were based  in the Kurdistan region of Northern Iraq, Europe,
and  the  United  States,  sought  to  develop  a  common  framework  of
opposition to the Ba'thist regime.  Democracy,  Islam, federalism, pluralism,
and  human  rights-the  cardinal  values  of  the  final  constitution-all
achieved prominence  in Iraqi political discussions  during this period.  In an
important  sense,  then,  the constitution bears  the  imprint of the  opposition
politics that preceded its drafting.
The  second  claim  advanced  in  this  essay  is  that,  as  the  constitutional
process  became  increasingly  participatory  and  democratic  in  the  period
from  the  fall  of  Saddam  Hussein  to  ratification,  the  constitution  itself
became increasingly  Islamic in orientation and detail.  The antecedent ideas
present  in  the  Iraqi  opposition's  earliest  constitutional  plans  were  largely
retained,  but  popular  politics  and  the  engagement  with  post-invasion
political  reality altered  the balance  in favor  of more  explicit and powerful
provisions  oriented  to  Islamic  law.  This  balance  changed  in  a  series  of
steps,  each  corresponding  to  a  greater  degree  of majoritarianism  in  the
constitutional  process.  To  put  it  simply,  more  democracy  meant  more
Islam.
The third claim is that while the final  constitution  sets the parameters  for
the relationship  between Islam  and democracy  in Iraq's  political order, the
text  alone  is  unlikely  to  determine  the  balance  once  and  for  all.  For  a
variety  of reasons-including  the  ongoing  insurgency,  the  constitution's
own  textual  ambiguities,  and  rapidly  shifting  ethnic  and  sectarian
alliances-the  final  balance  between  Islam  and  democracy  in  Iraq  will
depend as much on everyday political practice  as on specific  constitutional
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provisions.  In  this  sense,  the  Iraqi  constitutional  process  continues,  even
after ratification of the document itself.
Part I of this essay sets out a preliminary narrative of Iraq's constitutional
process, broadly  understood to  encompass the  period from the  early  1990s
(with the birth of the modem  Iraqi  opposition-in-exile)  through the present
day.  It  argues  that  the  basic  political  principles  undergirding  Iraqi
constitutionalism-Islam,  democracy,  federalism,  pluralism,  and  human
rights-were shaped by the same Iraqi politicians who would rise to power
after  the  fall  of  Saddam  Hussein.  These  figures,  operating  under  a
constitutional process shaped first and foremost by the Iraqi Shi'i cleric  'Ali
al-Sistani,  would  later  draw  upon  on  these  principles  when  drafting  the
interim constitution in 2004 and the permanent charter the following year.
Part II, which addresses the role of Islam, individual  rights, separation  of
powers,  federalism,  and  judicial  review  in  the  final  constitutional  text,
examines the key provisions through which  Iraqi  leaders  sought to balance
Islamic  and  democratic  values. 2  These  provisions  embody  compromises
between  Shi'i Islamists  seeking  to  maximize  the  document's  Islamic  and
majoritarian aspects  on the one hand, and,  on the  other, a loose  coalition of
Kurds,  secular nationalists,  and the United States urging  greater protection
of  individual  liberties  and  minority  rights.  Ultimately,  all  sides  made
concessions,  but  the  final  constitution  reflects  the  dominant  political
strength of the Shi'i Islamists.
Part  III  completes  the  essay  by  drawing  some  necessarily  tentative
conclusions  about  the  Iraqi  constitutional  process  overall.  It  stresses  that
Iraqi  politics  remains in  a  state of flux,  and that the  relationship  between
Islam and democracy  will evolve  over time.  It is  likely to be  shaped, but
not fully determined, by Iraq's constitutional text.
One caveat  is appropriate.  Although this essay focuses on the interaction
between  Islamic  and  democratic  principles  in  the  Iraqi  constitutional
process,  it is a striking  fact that this interaction was  not the major source of
controversy  among  domestic  political  actors  inside  Iraq  as  the  drafting
unfolded.  Federalism, not religion, proved the most contentious issue of all
in  Iraqi  constitutional  negotiations. 3   From  the  beginning,  most  Iraqi
politicians  agreed  that their new regime  would  embrace  Islam, democracy,
and  human  rights  simultaneously.  The  only  serious  differences  on these
issues  concerned  precisely  how  to balance  these  commitments  within  the
constitutional  text.  The Iraqi drafting debates  over this balance  were often
fierce,  and competing  attitudes  over Islamic  politics  have  fueled  many  of
the most passionate aiguments  over specific constitutional provisions.
2.  Except  where  otherwise  noted,  this  essay  relies  upon  the  unofficial  English
translation  of the permanent  Iraqi  constitution made publicly available  by  the  Independent
Electoral  Commission  of  Iraq  at
http://www.ieciraq.org/final%20cand/Constitution-EngUNs-  13.pdf.
3.  This  article  examines  the  Iraqi  constitution's  approach  to  federalism  only  to the
extent  that  the  federalism  settlement  may  impact  the  role  of  Islam  in  Iraq's  emerging
political and constitutional order.FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
I.  PROCESS
Formally,  Iraq's constitutional  process  lasted just over  six months,  from
the inauguration of the first elected Parliament  on March 16, 2005,  through
the successful  referendum  on October  15 of that year.  Broadly understood,
however,  the  process  began  much  earlier,  in  the wake  of the Gulf war of
1990-91,  with  the  efforts  of the  Iraqi  opposition-in-exile  to  hammer  out
political  principles  that  would  govern  a  post-Saddam  Iraq.  The  main
political  players  in this  opposition  were  the  same  men  who  would  write
Iraq's  interim and permanent  constitutions nearly fifteen years later.  From
the  start,  the  opposition's  basic  political vision  for Iraq  aimed to  provide
simultaneously  for  democracy,  Islamic  values,  federalism,  pluralism,  and
human  rights.  Over  time,  there  would  be  considerable  evolution  in the
relative  weight  given  to each  of these  principles,  particularly  as  political
power shifted toward the Shi'i Islamists  in the years immediately following
the  war.  But  the  core  elements  would  remain  the  same  and,  with  the
exception of federalism, would never be seriously challenged inside Iraq.4
A.  Opposition
The modem  Iraqi  opposition sprung  to  life  in  a series  of meetings  that
took place in  1992 in Vienna and Salah ad-Din, a Kurdish  city north of the
no-fly  zone  established  by  the  United  States  in  the  wake  of the  Kuwait
war.5  For opponents  of Saddam  Hussein,  the  Kuwait  war ended  in  great
disappointment.  Having  called  for an uprising, the United  States stood by
as the Iraqi regime crushed Shi'i and Kurdish rebellions.  In the wake of the
uprising's  failure,  Iraqi  opposition  members  of varying  ethnic,  religious,
and political  backgrounds  joined  together  with  U.S.  support  to  form  the
Iraqi National Congress  (INC),  a loose umbrella organization  which would
unite  the  disparate  parties  opposed  to  Saddam  Hussein's  rule.  The  INC
never became  a particularly effective  institutional  force to fight the Ba'thist
dictatorship  inside Iraq.  It did, however, provide  a framework for a series
of political  meetings  in which  leading  figures  from  each  of Iraq's  major
communities came together to discuss Iraq's future.6  The political diversity
of these  meetings  was  significant,  and they  helped  to  develop  a  shared
consensus around a core set of key constitutional principles which the major
4.  The  only  major  opposition  to  this basic  political  vision  has  come  from  the  Iraqi
insurgency, which has utterly failed to put forward a positive political program  of its own.
5.  For a good overview of the development of the Iraqi  opposition in  the context of the
tendentious U.S.-Iraqi  international  standoff in the  1990s,  see Andrew  Cockbum  &  Patrick
Cockburn,  Saddam  Hussein:  An  American  Obsession  44-57,  164-90,  211-50,  278-81
(2002);  Kenneth M.  Pollack, The  Threatening  Storm:  The  Case  for  Invading  Iraq  55-108
(2002); David Wurmser, Tyranny's Ally:  America's Failure to Defeat Saddam Hussein 9-41
(1999);  Laurie  Mylroie,  The  United States and the Iraqi National Congress, Middle  E.
Intelligence  Bull., Apr. 2001,  http://www.meib.org/articles/0104_irl.htm.
6.  These  meetings  largely  took  place outside  Iraq, but were also occasionally  held  in
the Iraqi Kurdistan region,  in areas outside Saddam Hussein's control.
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opposition  figures  would later  seek  to  implement  following  the  American
invasion.
The most important among  the Shi'i  Islamist opposition groups were the
Da'wa  Party  and the  Supreme  Council  for the  Islamic  Revolution  in  Iraq
(SCIRI). 7  Da'wa  was  founded  inside  Iraq  in  the  late  1950s,  under  the
influence  of the leading  Shi'i cleric Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr,  who would
be murdered by Saddam's  security  services  in  1980.8  Known  for its blend
of Iraqi  nationalism  and  Islamic  values,  Da'wa  would  leave  the  INC  in
1995  over growing objections to the Kurdish demand  for federalism.9  The
party eventually  splintered,  with  varying  factions  being  led from  London,
Tehran,  and  inside  Iraq.  Following  the  war,  two  of its  senior  figures,
Ibrahim  Jaafari  and Nuri  al-Maliki  would  successively  lead  elected  Iraqi
governments as Prime Minister.
SCIRI  was  founded  in  1982  in  Tehran  by  the  prominent  Shi'i  cleric
Ayatollah  Muhammad  Baqir  al-Hakim  with  the funding  and  assistance  of
the Iranian government.' 0  Its party militia, the Badr  Corps, was trained by
Iran to conduct  periodic raids into  Iraq during the Iran-Iraq  war.  The scion
of a  family  of prominent  Najafi  clerics,  Hakim  never  fully  set  forth  his
political  vision  for  post-Saddam  Iraq.  Though  at  one  point  he  had
expressed  support for Khomeini's  doctrine of the rule of the jurist, wilayat
al-faqih (a position that deviated from that of the traditionally quietist Najaf
clergy), he had also publicly  embraced  democracy  as the preferred regime
for post-war  Iraq."I  Muhammad  Baqir al-Hakim  was assassinated in Najaf
7.  For more background  on the Shi'i religious parties, see Juan Cole, The Iraqi  Shiites:
On the History ofAmerica's Would-Be Allies, Boston Rev.,  Oct.-Nov. 2003,  at 21,  available
at http://www.bostonreview.net/BR28.5/cole.html.
8.  Fouad  Ajami,  The  Foreigner's  Gift:  The  Americans,  the Arabs,  and  the  Iraqis  in
Iraq 93, 225 (2006).
9.  For  the  best  examination  of the  range  of religious  Shi'i  opinions  on  federalism
before  the  war,  see  Reidar  Visser,  Shi'i  Perspectives on a  Federal Iraq:  Territory,
Community,  and Ideology  in  Conceptions of a  New  Iraqi Polity,  in  Oil  in  the  Gulf:
Obstacles  to Democracy  and  Development  125  (Daniel  Heradstveit  &  Helge  Hveem  eds.,
2004).
10.  For  a  profile  of  Ayatollah  Muhammad  Baqir  al-Hakim,  and  a  broader  pre-war
account  of the  Shi'i Islamist opposition,  see Jon Lee  Anderson, Dreaming of Baghdad: An
Opposition  Leader Waits for War, New Yorker, Feb.  10,  2003, at 58.
11.  The democratic  bonafides of the Supreme Council  for the Islamic Revolution  in Iraq
(SCIRI)  have been  repeatedly  called  into  question  by  some  commentators,  in  part  due  to
Hakim's  alleged  support  for Iranian-style  theocratic  rule.  See Cole supra note  7; see also
Iraq Transition-The Way Ahead (Part  II):  Hearing  Before the S.  Comm. on Foreign Rel.,
108th  Cong.  (2004)  (testimony  of Larry  Diamond,  Senior  Fellow,  Hoover  Inst.,  Stanford
Univ.),  available  at  http://www.senate.gov/-foreign/testimony/2004/Diamond
Testimony040519.pdf.  But  it  is  important  to  recognize  that  until  the  2003  war,  Hakim
operated  from  Tehran  under  the protection  of the  Iranian  government.  From  the  time  he
returned  to  Iraq  in  May  2003  until  his  death  in  August  2003,  he  expressed  support  for
democracy  in  Iraq,  and  since  then  SCIRI  has consistently  pursued  a  democratic  political
platform  (albeit while  retaining  the  Badr  Corps  as  an  armed  militia  force  independent  of
democratic  control).  Indeed,  it  is hard to imagine  why SCIRI  would  have permitted  Iraq's
democratic  constitution to be so difficult to amend  if,  as some allege,  the party's long-termFORDHAM LAW REVIEW
in August 2003,  leaving  his brother  'Abd  al-'Aziz to assume  leadership of
SCIRI. 12  The younger brother would follow a pragmatic course throughout
the  post-war  period,  participating  fully  in  Iraq's  political  transition  and
playing  the  lead  role  in  representing  Shi'i  Islamist  interests  in  the
constitutional  discussions.
Also  central to  the Iraqi opposition were the  two main Kurdish  political
organizations,  the  Kurdistan  Democratic  Party  (KDP)  led  by  Mas'ud
Barzani  and the Patriotic Union  of Kurdistan  (PUK) led by Jalal Talabani.
Following  the  Gulf  War,  these  leaders  began  constructing  a  quasi-
autonomous  regional  government  in Northern Iraq, funded by oil  revenues
administered  by the United Nations  and  protected by American  airpower.
The  KDP  and PUK  were  bitter rivals, and despite  their INC  membership,
they  fought  an  internal  Kurdish civil war between  1994  and  1996.  In the
post-invasion  constitutional  discussions,  however,  Barzani  and  Talabani
presented  a powerful  and  united  front  in defense  of federalism  and  other
Kurdish  interests.  They  also  provided  a  consistent  voice  in  favor  of
secularism,  fearing  the  rise  of  a  Shi'i  Islamist  dictatorship  to  replace
Saddam's secular tyranny.
Finally, the original INC coalition also included a series of secular parties
and independents.  Most prominent among  these was Ahmad  Chalabi, who
was chosen to lead the INC's Executive  Council. 13  Born into a prominent
Baghdad merchant  family,  Chalabi  fled  Iraq  in  the  wake  of the  military
coup  of  1958  as  a young  teenager.14  A  mathematician  by  training  and
banker  by  profession,  Chalabi  would  become  a  brilliant  if opportunistic
political  strategist and dealmaker. 15  A  secular democrat  and by identity a
Shi'i, he balanced  his appeal to American officials  with efforts  to cultivate
ties to  Iran  and  the  Shi'i religious  parties.  Chalabi's  main  rival  among
secular exiles was Iyad 'Allawi, a reputed former Ba'thist intelligence agent
who had turned against Saddam Hussein  in the  1970s.16  Also a Shi'i Arab,
'Allawi  boasted credibility with Sunnis  disaffected with the regime; he also
provided  extensive  contacts  in  Iraqi  military  and  intelligence  circles.
'Allawi's  Sunni  connections  were  of considerable  value,  given the overall
imbalance  of the INC in favor of Kurds and Shi'is.  Both  men would  later
assume leading roles in the post-Saddam political structures, and from June
aim  is to  transform  Iraq  into  an Islamic  theocracy.  On  the  amendment  process,  see  Iraq
Const. art. 122.
12.  For the  consequences  of the  assassination,  see Noah Feldman,  What  We Owe  Iraq:
War and the  Ethics of Nation  Building 38-39  (2004).  For  a profile of the younger Hakim,
see Jon Lee Anderson,  The Candidate,  New Yorker, Feb. 2, 2004, at 50.
13.  For a  profile  of AhmadChalabi,  see  Jane  Mayer,  The  Manipulator,  New  Yorker,
June 7,  2004, at  58.  On  his role  in promoting the overthrow of Saddam  Hussein,  see  Peter
W. Galbraith,  The End of Iraq:  How American  Incompetence  Created  a War Without  End
84-87 (2006).
14.  See Mayer, supra note  13,  at 62.
15.  See id.
16.  For a profile  of lyad  'Allawi,  see  Jon  Lee  Anderson, A  Man of the Shadows, New
Yorker, Jan. 24, 2005,  at 56.
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2004  through  March  2005  'Allawi  would  serve  as  Prime  Minister  of the
appointed Iraqi Interim Government.
The  purpose  of the  Iraqi  opposition,  of  course,  was  to  promote  the
downfall  of Saddam  Hussein  and  his  Ba'thist  regime  in Baghdad,  using
whatever  political,  military,  intelligence,  propaganda,  and  other  means  at
their disposal.  The  INC  announced  its political  vision  for  a post-Saddam
Hussein Iraq  following  its  initial  1992  meeting  at Salah  ad-Din,  when  the
leading parties  adopted  a series  of principles  enshrined  in  the  initial  INC
Articles  of Association. 17  The  Articles  called  for building  "a  system  of
government  that  respects  human  rights  and  [is]  democratic,  federal,
pluralistic,  and  parliamentary  in  the  context  of  constitutional  institutions
within the rule of law and an independent judiciary."' 8  They pledged to "be
guided  by  all  that  is  noble  and  humane  in  the  history  of mankind  and
civilization  especially  the  tenets  of  Islam  and  its  compassionate  and
benevolent values; Islam is the religion of the State."' 9  The Articles further
emphasized  the  importance  of  "cultural  and  political  pluralism,"  and
reinforced  the group's commitment  to  "[t]he  ballot box"  as the "arbiter  of
legitimacy  in  any  future  government  or  regime  through  free,  direct  and
honest elections conducted through secret ballot."20
These  core  ideas--democracy,  Islam, federalism,  pluralism,  and human
rights--constituted  the  stated program  of the Iraqi opposition parties, both
before  and  after  the  invasion  of  Iraq  in  2003.  In  developing  them,  the
opposition  was  encouraged  and  supported  by  the  U.S.  government,
especially after the terrorist attacks of September  11,  2001.  From late 2001
through  early  2003,  as  the  U.S.  government  moved  towards  war  against
Saddam Hussein, it also increased its outreach to the opposition,  sponsoring
a series of formal political meetings and smaller roundtable  discussions  for
opponents  of the  regime.  The  Americans  hoped  not  only  to  stimulate
thinking  on post-war  political  reconstruction,  but also to  show  that  Iraq's
liberation  would  be  a  joint  operation  supported  by  the  Iraqi  people
themselves,  and  that  it  would  serve  the  interests  of  democracy. 2'  The
INC's core political principles were repeatedly  reaffirmed  (albeit in slightly
different  language)  in  the  main  political  statements  issued  by  the  Iraqi
opposition in the run-up to the war.22
17.  See  Iraqi  Nat'l  Cong.  (INC),  The  Articles  of Association  of the  Iraqi  National
Congress,  (Oct.  31,  1992)  [hereinafter  INC  Articles  of  Association],  available  at
http://inciraq.com/English/1NC/1992%201NC%2OArticles%20of'/20AssociationEn.htm
(unofficial  translation).
18.  Id. art.  1.
19.  Id.
20.  Id.
21.  For a  personal  account  of U.S.  efforts  to  cultivate  the  Iraqi  opposition  before  the
war, see David L. Phillips, Losing Iraq:  Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco (2005).
22.  See,  e.g.,  Political Statement  of the  Iraqi Opposition  Conference in  London,
Kurdistan  Observer, Dec.  19.,  2002, available at http://home.cogeco.ca/-konews/20-12-02-
political-statement-london-conference.html;  Final  Statement,  Meeting  of the  Coordination
and  Follow-Up  Committee  Held  in  Salahaddin,  26  February-I  March,  2003,
http://www.wadinet.de/news/dokus/final-statement.htm  (last  visited  Aug.  24, 2006).  OneFORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Despite  its  best  efforts,  the  Iraqi  opposition  never  developed  into  an
effective  political  or  military  tool  against  the regime.  A  series  of failed
military  coups  and  the  Kurdish  in-fighting  of the  mid-1990s  ended  any
serious  hope for an opposition-led  regime change in Baghdad.  It was only
the  events  of  September  11-and  the  personal  ties  that  Chalabi  had
developed  with  leading  American  neoconservatives,  by  then  firmly
ensconced  in  the  Bush  Administration-that  would  raise  the  Iraqi
opposition's profile  as a potential  partner  in an American  effort  to replace
the  Ba'thist  dictatorship.  Thus,  despite  lacking  any  ability  to  topple  the
regime  on its own, the opposition would be given the chance to  implement
its  core  political  principles  in the  constitutional  process  to  take  place  in
post-Saddam Hussein Iraq.
B.  Occupation
Baghdad fell to Coalition  forces on April 9,  2003.23  Some three months
later,  with the blessing and assistance of the United Nations,  the American-
led  Coalition  Provisional  Authority  (CPA)  formally  established  the  Iraqi
Governing  Council  (IGC),  which  would  serve  alongside  the  CPA  as  the
chief Iraqi political entity throughout the period of formal occupation.24  All
of the  major  opposition  parties  and  personalities  from  before  the  war-
including  SCIRI's  'Abd  al-'Aziz  al-Hakim,  Da'wa's  Jaafari,  Chalabi,
'Allawi,  and  the  Kurdish  leaders  Barzani  and  Talabani-were  named  to
leading  roles. 25  Also joining  the  IGC  were  several  Sunni  Arabs  who had
been  wary  of involvement  with the  opposition  movement  before the  war.
possible  counterexample  to  this  trend  was  the Final  Report  of the  Democratic  Principles
Working  Group,  a group of Iraqi oppositionists  organized by the  U.S.  State Department  to
consider  issues  relating  to  a democratic  transition  in Iraq.  The  report's  strikingly  secular
outlook  is  most  likely  due  to  the  influence  of its  primary  author,  the  Iraqi  writer  Kanan
Makiya.  It was never given the formal blessing of the Iraqi political parties. See Democratic
Principles Working Group, U.S. Dep't of State, Final Report on the Transition to Democracy
in  Iraq,  (Nov.  2002),  available  at  http://www.wadinet.de/news/dokus/transition-to_
democracy.pdf;  see also  George  Packer,  The  Assassins'  Gate:  America  in  Iraq  66-99
(2005); Phillips, supra note 21,  at 77-87,  94-95.
23.  Patrick  E.  Tyler,  U.S.  Forces  Take  Control in  Baghdad; Bush  Elated;  Some
Resistance Remains, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 2003, at AI.
24.  Several  days  after  it was  established, the Iraqi  Governing Council  (IGC)  released  a
"Political  Statement"  which  again  reaffirmed  the  substantive  constitutional  principles  that
had been embraced  by the opposition in exile. See IGC, Political  Statement  (July 2003)  (on
file with the Fordham Law Review).  The Council wrote  that among  its key objectives  were
the following:
Laying down the foundation for a pluralistic federal democratic system that insures
public  liberties,  freedom  of  opinion  and  expression,  respect  of  human  rights,
respect  for  the  Islamic  identity  of the  majority  of the  Iraqi  people,  respect  for
women['s]  rights  and  enhancement  of  the  judiciary  and  guaranteeing  its
independence;  and  above  all  to  launch  the  democratic  process  to  adopt  a
permanent constitution for the country.
Id.
25.  On the IGC,  see Feldman, supra  note  12,  at  108-12.  On the international  legal  basis
for the IGC,  see S.C.  Res.  1483,  U.N. Doc.  S/RES/1483  (May 22,  2003); S.C. Res.  1500,
1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1500 (Aug.  14,  2003).
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Most prominent among them were Adnan Pachachi, an elder statesman who
had served  as  Iraq's  Foreign Minister  in  the  1960s,  and  Muhsin  'Abd  al-
Hamid, the  Secretary General  of the Iraqi  Islamic  Party, a Sunni group  that
had been operating  inside Iraq.  The twenty-five members of the IGC chose
these figures  (together with the  respected  Shi'i cleric  Muhammad Bahr  al-
'Ulum) to serve as their rotating, nine-man presidential council.
As  it  began  its  work,  the  most  pressing  task  facing  the  IGC  was  to
establish  a  process  for  drafting  a  new  Iraqi  constitution  and  holding
elections.  There was never any question that a new constitution  would need
to be written  from scratch.26  Under the leadership  of U.S.  Ambassador  L.
Paul Bremer, the CPA initially envisioned that a representative  assembly of
Iraqis  from  around  the  country  would  write  a  new  constitution,  which
would subsequently  be ratified  in  a national  referendum.  Elections  would
then be  held pursuant to the  new constitution, after which the CPA  would
dissolve and power would be transferred to the elected Iraqi government.27
At the time, some of the newly named IGC members objected that delaying
the transfer of formal authority to an elected government until after the new
constitution  had  been  approved  and  elections  held  would  take  too  long.
They did not, however,  initially  object  to the notion of an unelected  body
actually performing the drafting.
On  June  30,  however,  two  weeks  before  the formation  of the  IGC,  the
CPA's  constitutional  plan  came  under  direct  challenge  from  outside  the
group  of former  exiles  and others  who would  comprise  the  IGC.  Grand
Ayatollah  'Ali  al-Sistani,  the most  prominent  Shi'i cleric  in  Iraq, issued a
fatwa declaring that any constitution not drafted by a democratically  elected
body  would  be  "unacceptable." 28  The fatwa  signaled  a  new  era of Shi'i
26.  The  IGC  members  deemed  the Ba'thist  "provisional  constitution"  of 1970,  which
was still in effect with amendments  proposed by Saddam  Hussein  in 1990, as clearly beyond
the  pale,  and  no  serious  consideration  was  given  to  readopting  Iraq's  monarchical
constitution of 1925  (or, for that matter, its military  constitution  of 1958).  For an overview
of  Iraq's  troubled  constitutional  history,  see  Nathan  J.  Brown,  Constitutionalism,
Authoritarianism,  and Imperialism in Iraq,  53 Drake L. Rev. 923 (2005).
27.  Since  well before  the war, the Bush Administration's political  planning had always
assumed  that the  new constitution would  be written before  holding  elections, which  would
take  far too long to  organize.  From  the start,  L.  Paul Bremer operated  on this assumption,
especially  after  an extensive  assessment conducted by the  United Nations  in the  summer of
2003  confirmed  that  it  would  take  close  to  a  year  to  prepare  for  elections.  See  L.  Paul
Bremer III,  Iraq's  Path to Sovereignty, Wash.  Post, Sept. 8, 2003, at A2 1.  This  CPA plan
was  generally consistent with  the constitutional  process  proposed  by the report of the State
Department-organized  Future  of Iraq  Project,  in particular  in  its  decision  to  hold  national
elections  only after a new constitution had been written. See Democratic Principles Working
Group, supra note 22, at 13-14.
28.  The relevant  portion of thefatwa read as follows:
Those  forces [the  Coalition]  have  no jurisdiction whatsoever to  appoint  members
of the  Constitution preparation  assembly.  Also  there  is  no  guarantee  either that
this assembly will prepare  a constitution  that serves  the  best interests  of the  Iraqi
people or express their national  identity whose backbone is sound Islamic religion
and noble social values.  The  said plan is unacceptable  from the outset.  First of all
there  must  be a  general  election  so  that  every  Iraqi  citizen-who  is  eligible  to
vote-can  choose  someone  to  represent  him  in  a  foundational  ConstitutionFORDHAM LA W REVIEW
religious  influence  in  Iraq's  transitional  political  process.2 9  Motivated  in
part by the concern that the United  States would impose a constitution  as it
had in post-war Japan in the  1940s, Sistani sought to prevent the use of this
tactic  in  Iraq.30  He  also  wanted  to  ensure  that  the  drafting  body  would
reflect  Iraq's  demographics  and,  most  important  of all,  its  majority-Shi'i
population.31  Sistani worded  his pronouncement  brilliantly, in democratic
language  devoid  of sectarianism.  It essentially  hoisted  the Americans  by
their own petard, putting them in the uncomfortable  position of seeming to
oppose elections,  despite  having purportedly  launched the  war to  advance
democratic principles.
It also reflected an important step in the gradual development of Sistani's
unique brand of political theory.32  The quietism that had been his hallmark
while  Iraq  was  ruled  by  Saddam  Hussein  began  to  give  way  to  a  more
activist  approach,  in which  the  authority of the  marja' at-taqlid, or senior
authoritative  Shi'i jurist,  could  be  invoked  with  respect  to  questions  of
constitutional  structure.  This kind of intervention fell  very far short of the
rule by  the jurist envisioned  under Khomeini's theories  and embodied to a
greater  or  lesser  extent  in  various  versions  of  the  Iranian  constitution.
Sistani  was in  no  way  dictating  ordinary  policy nor purporting  to  review
political  decisions.  He  was,  however,  offering  a binding  legal  opinion,
couched  in  democratic  theory,  on  the legitimate  structures  of constitution
making.  This degree of involvement  in constitutional politics would cast a
long shadow over subsequent constitutional  negotiations.
preparation  assembly.  Then the drafted  Constitution  can be  put to  a referendum.
All  believers  must  insist  on  the  accomplishment  of  this  crucial  matter  and
contribute to achieving it in the best way possible.
Letter  from  Grand  Ayatollah  Sayyid  Ali Al-Husseini  A1-Sistani  to  a  Group  of Believers
(June 26, 2003), available  at http://www.sistani.org/messages/eng/ir5.htm.
29.  See Noah Feldman,  The Democratic  Fatwa: Islam and Democracy in the Realm of
Constitutional  Politics, 58 Okla. L. Rev. 1, 1-9 (2005).
30.  L.  Paul  Bremer  III with  Malcolm  McConnell,  My  Year  in Iraq:  The  Struggle  to
Build a Future of Hope 94 (2006).
31.  Indeed,  it is virtually impossible  to overestimate  the vehemence with which the Shi'i
political and clerical  leadership  insisted on obtaining  a numerical majority  in virtually all of
Iraq's transitional  institutions-from the IGC (and  its nine-man Presidential  Council), to the
initial  cabinet,  to  the  Iraqi  Interim  Government  appointed  in  June  2004.  Many
commentators  have  blamed the CPA for imposing  ethnic  and sectarian  quotas  on  the  Iraqi
people (and hence enflaming  intercommunal  tensions), but this criticism misses the fact that
allocating posts roughly in proportion to estimated demographic realities was, quite simply, a
political  necessity.  For an  example  of this  criticism,  see  Kenneth  M.  Pollack  et al.,  The
Saban  Ctr.  for Middle  E. Policy  at  the Brookings  Inst.,  Analysis  Paper No. 7, A  Switch  in
Time:  A  New  Strategy  for  America  in  Iraq  54  (Feb.  2006),  available  at
http://www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/analysis/20060215-iraqreport.pdf.
32.  For more  on  Sistani's  political  thought,  Iraq's  homegrown  Shi'i  clergy,  and  their
relationship  to  the  Shi'i political parties,  see  Ajami, supra note  8,  at  87-108;  Reuel  Marc
Gerecht,  The  Islamic  Paradox:  Shiite  Clerics,  Sunni Fundamentalists,  and  the  Coming of
Arab Democracy  17-43  (2004); Juan Cole,  The United States and Shi 'ite Religious Factions
in Post-Ba 'athist  Iraq, 57 Middle East J.  543  (2003); Reidar Visser, Norweigan Inst. of Int'l
Affairs,  Paper No.  700,  Sistani, the  United  States  and  Politics  in Iraq:  From Quietism  to
Machiavellianism?  (Mar. 2006), available at http://www.nupi.no/IPS/filestore/700.pdf.
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For  the  Americans,  the fatwa  posed  an  acute  practical  problem.  It
seemed  likely  to  delay  the  start  of the  constitutional  process  by  nine  to
twelve months, the period U.N. experts estimated  it would take to  organize
and hold national elections. 33  Meeting  Sistani's demand,  while holding  to
the CPA's proposed sequence of transitional events  (constitution  first, then
referendum  and elections,  and  finally transfer  of authority  to  a  sovereign
Iraqi  government)  would  result  in  a  formal  occupation  lasting  nearly  two
years.34  For  American  officials  eager  to  transfer  authority  to  an  Iraqi
government that would be formally recognized as legitimate and sovereign
by the international  community, this was far too long to wait.
As a result, for nearly six months, the IGC and CPA desperately-and, in
retrospect, mistakenly-sought to craft an alternative to direct  elections that
would satisfy the terms of Sistani'sfatwa while allowing  the constitutional
drafting process to begin  immediately.  Even the Shi'i Islamist members of
the IGC  closest to Sistani  sought a solution  short of direct elections.  They
too  hoped  to  end  the  American  occupation  on  as  short  a  timetable  as
possible.
35
At the root of the decision not to comply immediately with thefatwa was
a  fundamental  lack  of  appreciation,  among  both  Americans  and  Iraqi
leaders,  of the  popular  influence  wielded  by  the  Shi'i  clerical  leadership,
and  by  Sistani  in  particular.  For  decades  in  Iraq,  dictatorial,  Sunni-
dominated  regimes  had  brutally  suppressed  the  country's  Shi'i  clerics,
forcing them to keep quiet and depriving  them of any role in Iraqi political
life.36  Before  the  war,  U.S.  officials  (along  with  many,  though  not  all,
outside  experts)  had  failed to grasp  the extent to which  large  segments  of
Iraqi society would look to the clerical hierarchy for guidance in the power
vacuum that followed  Saddam Hussein's rule.  U.S.  officials  believed  that
Iraq was  far more  secular than the  Iranian  theocracy,  and  that  in  any  case
the  traditionally  quietist  Iraqi  clergy  would  choose  to  remain  outside  the
political sphere.37  Bush Administration officials  advocated the growth of a
33.  Bremer with McConnell, supra note  30, at 164.
34.  Id.
35.  Indeed,  for  months  after  the fatwa, prominent  members  of SCIRI  along  with key
Shi'i politicians  with  ties  to  Sistani,  including Mowaffaq  al-Rubaiee  and Ahmed  Chalabi,
repeatedly  proposed  options for forming a constitutional convention  that were well  short  of
meeting Sistani's demand for direct, national elections.
36.  See Ajami, supra note 8, at 87-108.
37.  On this  general point,  see  Feldman, supra note  12,  at  79;  Noah Feldman, Imposed
Constitutionalism,  37 Conn. L. Rev. 857, 865-68,  875-78 (2005).  For examples of American
officials  and experts underestimating  the importance of Islam and the clerical  leadership, see
Pollack, supra note  5, at 400-02;  Wurmser, supra note  5, at  70-79;  Daniel L.  Byman and
Kenneth  M.  Pollack, Democracy in Iraq?, Wash.  Q.,  Summer 2003,  at  122;  Interview  by
Melissa  Block, Nat'l  Pub.  Radio,  with  Paul  Wolfowitz,  Deputy  Sec'y  of Def. (Feb.  19,
2003),  available at  http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/t02202003-t0219npr.html.
A  leading  neoconservative  statement  of  the  case  for  war  did  not  even  mention  the
importance  of the Shi'i  clergy at all. See Lawrence  F. Kaplan  & William  Kristol,  The War
Over  Iraq:  Saddam's  Tyranny  and  America's  Mission  (2003).  Finally,  it  is worth  noting
that the news media also  failed to grasp  the significance  of the  Shi'i clergy  before the  war.
A search of the Lexis-Nexis  English language news database, for example, reveals  that in theFORDHAM LA W REVIEW
democracy  in  Muslim  Iraq,  but  hoped  and  expected  it  to  resemble  the
Turkish  model  of  state  secularism. 38   Secular  and  westernized  Iraqi
opposition leaders,  particularly  Ahmad  Chalabi, also encouraged  this  view
among American leaders and experts.
Ultimately, despite  the entreaties  of Iraqis  and Americans  alike,  Sistani
refused  to budge  from  his  constitutional fatwa.39  The  debate  came  to  a
head  in November  2003,  when  the  CPA  and Iraqi political  leaders  finally
concluded  that  Sistani's  demands  would  simply  be  impossible  to
circumvent.  Together, they produced a new plan consistent with thefatwa,
and  IGC  officials  consulted  with  Najaf to  ensure  that the  new  proposals
would be acceptable.  At the time,  Sistani gave his private endorsement  to
the plan (though he would later raise  a new series of objections to a number
of its key elements). 40  On November  15,  2003,  the CPA and IGC formally
announced  the  new  constitutional  process.4 1  The  most  important  change
was to the  sequence  of events.  According  to the new  transition timetable,
the  IGC  would write  an  interim constitution  by March 2004.  This  interim
constitution would go into effect following the establishment of a sovereign
Iraqi government  in June  2004.  It  would guarantee  a  federal,  democratic,
and pluralistic Iraq that respected human rights.42  National elections would
year  before  the  war-a time  in which  there  was  great  interest in  and  discussion  of Iraqi
politics, culture, and society-a grand total of thirty-three news articles made any mention of
Sistani  (in  contrast  to  1195  mentioning  Ahmad  Chalabi  in  the  same  period,  and  15,895
articles mentioning Sistani in the two years following the invasion).
38.  On Turkey as a possible model for Muslim  democracy, see Douglas Jehl & David E.
Sanger,  U.S. Tells Iran Not to Interfere in Iraq Efforts, N.Y.  Times,  Apr.  24,  2003,  at  Al
(quoting White House  Press Secretary Ari Fleischer); Interview by Turkish TV with Sec'y of
State,  Colin  L.  Powell,  in  Ankara,  Turkey  (Apr.  2,  2003),  available  at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/19364.htm;  Dr.  Condoleezza
Rice,  Nat'l  Sec.  Advisor,  Briefing  in  Washington,  D.C.  (May  14,  2003),  available at
http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/20558.htm;  Paul  Wolfowitz,  Deputy  Sec'y  of  Def.,  Remarks  in
Arundel  House,  London,  England  (Dec.  2,  2002),  available  at
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20021202-depsecdef.html.
39.  Iraqi  political  leaders  routinely  traveled  to  Najaf to  meet with  Sistani  and discuss
constitutional  matters.  Despite numerous  initiatives by the CPA,  Sistani never met  directly
with American  officials, though he and Bremer did exchange oral and written messages  on a
relatively  frequent  basis.  See  Bremer  with  McConnell,  supra note  30,  at  166-67,  271-73,
301-04, 364,  380-82.
40,  Id. at  229.  CPA  officials  were  understandably  frustrated with  the  new  round  of
Sistani objections,  which included a demand that the transitional government  to take  power
in June 2004 be directly  elected, instead of being chosen through  a decentralized  process of
provincial  caucuses.  This  demand  was  entirely  new,  as  the  original  fatwa  had  only
concerned the  selection  mechanism for  the constitutional drafting body. See id. at 240.  His
complaints  about  the  unelected  nature  of the  transitional  government  would ultimately  be
assuaged by a high-level delegation  from the United Nations led by former Algerian Foreign
Minister Lakdhar Brahimi.
41.  See  id.  at  231-33,  243;  Agreement  on  Political  Process  between  Coalition
Provisional  Authority  and  Governing  Council  of  Iraq  (Nov.  15,  2003),  available at
http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/iraq/cpa03a.htm.
42.  It  is striking that the  political  principles set forth in the  November  15  agreement-
unlike  the  various  opposition  statements  before  the  war,  and  the  IGC's  own  political
statement issued in July---did not include  any mention of Islam or Islamic  values.  This was
an  accidental  oversight, and  was  objected  to  by  Shi'i  Islamists  in  the  days  following  the
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be  held  as  soon  as  possible,  and the  elected  assembly  would  proceed  to
draft a new permanent constitution.
Shortly after signing the November  15  agreement, the IGC  established  a
drafting  committee  to begin work on the interim constitution,  or, as  it was
formally  called  to  avoid  breaching  Sistani's  fatwa,  the  Transitional
Administrative  Law  (TAL).43  Adnan Pachachi,  who  had been  chosen  to
chair  the  committee,  and  KDP  representatives  immediately  tabled  rival
drafts  of the document.  Both versions  proved problematic,  however, and
neither would serve as the basis for the final TAL.  Soon, discussions in the
committee became  bogged down  over the issue of federalism-in no small
part due to the hard-line  demands of its Kurdish members, whose inflexible
drive  for maximum  autonomy  in  Northern  Iraq was  anathema to virtually
all of the ethnic Arabs on the IGC.
In early January, the drafting committee  adjourned for several weeks.  At
the urging  of Iraqis  on all sides of the political  spectrum, Bremer began a
series  of side discussions with the Kurds to prepare draft TAL  language on
federalism,  for  subsequent  consideration  by  the  IGC.44   Separately,
Pachachi's  chief  aide  on  the  constitutional  process,  an  Iraqi-American
lawyer named  Feisal  Amin  al-Istrabadi,  initiated  a  set  of small,  informal
consultations  together  with  Salem  Chalabi  (Ahmad  Chalabi's  nephew  and
principal  deputy  on constitutional  matters)  and CPA  officials to prepare  a
"Chairman's  Draft" of the  document  essentially  from scratch.45  Pachachi
hoped to introduce this draft to the full IGC with CPA backing.  Istrabadi's
discussions  focused  primarily  on  nuts-and-bolts  issues  that  were  not
deemed  politically  contentious-mechanisms  for  government  formation,
phrasing  on  human  rights  guarantees,  structure  of  the  judiciary,  etc.
Ultimately,  both  sets  of discussions  proved  successful.  By mid-February,
Pachachi  circulated  a  sixty-four  article  draft  constitution  incorporating
Bremer's  agreement  with the  Kurds (which  had  already been  vetted  with
IGC  Arabs)  and  the  more  technical  provisions  worked  out by  Istrabadi's
staff-level discussions.
In the  final two  weeks of February,  the  Governing  Council worked  day
and  night  to  finish  the  TAL  on  schedule.  As  the  February  28  deadline
agreement  (despite the fact that none of them had proposed  such language  when negotiating
the document).  Bremer made clear to the Islamists that there could indeed be a formal place
for Islam in the Transitional Administrative  Law (TAL), and on December 2, 2003,  he sent a
secret letter to Sistani highlighting and confirming  this point.
43.  No  definitive account  of the  TAL drafting  process  has yet been  written.  Thus  far,
the best discussions  of the TAL  can be  found in Bremer with McConnell,  supra note 30,  at
286-308; Larry  Diamond, Squandered Victory:  The American  Occupation and the Bungled
Effort  to  Bring  Democracy  to  Iraq  140-78  (2005);  Feisal  Amin  al-Istrabadi,  Reviving
Constitutionalism in  Iraq:  Key  Provisions of the  Transitional Administrative Law,  50
N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 269 (2006).
44.  For more  details on the Bremer-Kurd  deal,  see  Diamond, supra note 43,  at 161-71;
Int'l Crisis  Group,  Iraq's Kurds:  Towards an Historic Compromise?, Middle  East Rep.,
Apr. 8, 2004.
45.  On these talks,  see Diamond, supra note 43, at  144-61.FORDHAM  LA W REVIEW
approached,  the  Council  hammered  out  compromises  on the  dozen  or  so
remaining  contentious  issues,  including  the  structure  and  powers  of the
executive  branch,  the  role  of Islam,  and  the  procedures  for  ratifying  the
permanent constitution.  It was in this late phase of the negotiations that the
Shi'i  Islamist  parties,  led  by  SCIRI,  began  pressing  hard  for  a  series  of
demands  that  would  enhance  the  TAL's  commitment  to  Islam  and
strengthen its majoritarian bent.  This effort bore fruit, as the Shi'i bloc won
many key  substantive  changes  to  the draft.  The modifications  included a
prohibition  on  laws  contravening  Islam,  a  stronger  role  for  the  National
Assembly  (which  would  undoubtedly  include  a  Shi'i  majority),  and
assurances that any agreement  on federalism would not preclude the future
formation of additional regions in Shi'i areas of the country.
The TAL process ended  in the early morning hours of March  1, when  an
exhausted  Iraqi Governing Council unanimously agreed on a final draft.  At
SCIRI's insistence,  all decisions throughout the TAL negotiations  had been
made  by consensus.  The  vote  to  approve  the  document  was  literally  the
only vote taken throughout the entire process.  Despite the agreement, in the
days that followed,  Sistani once  again raised a new  set of objections to the
TAL.  His central complaint was a TAL provision, added  at the last minute,
which granted the Kurds (or any  group of three Iraqi provinces) the right to
block adoption of a permanent  constitution if two-thirds  of their populations
voted to reject the document  in the ratification referendum.46  This time, the
Shi'i Islamists resisted Sistani's demand.  After flocking to Najaf, they won
Sistani's grudging  agreement that they could sign the document, albeit with
"reservations."
The  IGC  formally  signed  the  TAL  on  March  8,  in  a  ceremony  at the
Baghdad Convention  Center.  The final document  enacted-at least  on  an
interim  basis-the  political  vision of the prewar  Iraqi  opposition.  It was
fundamentally  democratic, while also making clear the prominence of Islam
in  Iraqi politics  and society.  It protected human rights,  while  establishing
institutional  mechanisms that created the separation of powers and multiple
checks  and  balances.  The  TAL  also  set  forth  a  proto-settlement  on
federalism  in  which  the  Kurds  would  generally  retain  their  existing
autonomy,  while  acknowledging  exclusive  central  authority  over  national
finance, foreign and defense policy, and natural resources.
In  the  wake  of  its  final  approval,  Sistani  continued  to  signal  his
unhappiness  with the  interim charter.  In June,  he intervened to prevent its
incorporation  in the U.N. Security Council Resolution formally recognizing
46.  Law  of Administration  for the  State of Iraq  for  the Transitional  Period  (TAL)  art.
61(C).  This  article  relies  on the  English  translation of the TAL  produced  by the Coalition
Provisional Authority,  which  is available  at  http://www.cpa-iraq.org/govemment/TAL.html.
Sistani  was  entirely  unsympathetic  to  Kurdish  demands  for  constitutional  safeguards,  as
evidenced  in a strongly  worded message he passed to Bremer on  March 5. See Bremer with
McConnell, supra note 30, at 303-04.
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the  sovereign  Iraqi  government  established  in  June  2004.4 7  Nonetheless,
that  government  formally  supported  and  upheld  the  TAL,  as  did  the
subsequent  Iraqi  government  elected  in  2005.  In  this  respect,  the  TAL
served  its  purpose  of  providing  a  legal  framework  for  Iraq's  political
transition.  It  would  also  prove  to  be  a  baseline  and  starting  point  for
negotiations over the permanent  constitution the following year.
C.  Sovereignty
After the establishment of a sovereign Iraqi government  in June 2004, the
next  major  step  in  Iraq's  constitutional  process  was  the  election  of  a
Transitional  National  Assembly  (TNA)  on  January  30,  2005.  Under  the
procedures  established  in  the TAL, the  TNA  would  prepare  a draft of the
permanent constitution by August  15; the draft would then be presented for
popular ratification in a national referendum by October  15.48  The outcome
of the election was therefore critical; it would define a new political balance
of power that would shape the permanent constitutional negotiations.
On February  17,  2005,  the Iraqi electoral  commission  certified  the  final
results  of the  January  30  election.  The  Unified  Iraqi  Alliance  (UIA),  a
fractious  coalition  of Shi'i religious  parties  (including  SCIRI,  Da'wa,  and
representatives  of the radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr) that had been cobbled
together under  the general  guidance  of Sistani  and  his advisors,  won over
half of the 275  total seats.  A joint KDP-PUK Kurdish bloc took the second
largest  grouping  of seventy  seats.  Secular  liberals  had made  a  far  more
disappointing showing, as incumbent Prime Minister Iyad 'Allawi  won only
forty  (and incumbent  President Ghazi  al-Yawer only  five) delegates  to  the
Parliament.  The  most problematic  feature of the results,  however, was  the
near-total  absence  of  Sunni  Arab  delegates  in  the  TNA.  The  Sunni
community  had  essentially  boycotted  the  election-an  action  that  would
leave it without  qredible  voices  at the  constitutional  negotiating table  over
the months to come.
49
On  May  10,  2005,  the  TNA  established  a  fifty-five  member
Constitutional  Drafting  Committee  to  begin  work on  the document. 50  To
chair the Committee, which included delegates from all political parties, the
UIA proposed  SCIRI  official  Humam  al-Hammudi,  a Shi'i  cleric who had
47.  See Letter from Office of Ayatollah 'Ali  al-Sistani to President,  U.N.  Sec'y Council
(June  6,  2004), available at http://www.sistani.org/messages/eng/bay8.htm;  Dexter Filkins,
Kurds Threaten to  Walk Away from Iraqi  State, N.Y.  Times, June 9, 2004, at Al.
48.  See TAL art. 61 (A)-(B).
49.  See  Jonathan  Morrow,  U.S.  Inst.  of  Peace,  Special  Report  No.  155,  Iraq's
Constitutional Process II:  An Opportunity Lost 6 ( Nov. 2005).
50.  As  with  the  TAL,  no  comprehensive  account  of the  Iraqi  constitutional  drafting
process  has yet  appeared.  For some  early  fragmentary  overviews,  see  Int'l Crisis  Group,
Middle East Briefing No.  19, Unmaking  Iraq:  A  Constitutional Process  Gone Awry  (Sept.
26, 2005), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3703&l=1  (Web site
registration required  for a PDF of the full report);  Morrow, supra  note 49.FORDHAMLA WREVIEW
been  actively  involved  in  the  prewar  opposition  abroad. 51  Before  the
January  election,  Shi'i  and  Kurdish  leaders  had announced  their intent  to
incorporate  Sunni  representatives  in  the  drafting  process,  regardless  of
whether they participated  in the  vote.  After the  committee was formed, the
United States pressured them  to  fulfill their promise.  Following  weeks  of
negotiation,  on  June  16  Iraqi  leaders  announced  that  fifteen  Sunni
representatives  from outside the Parliament would join the committee,  with
full voting rights.
52
The substantive  constitutional negotiations  that continued throughout  the
summer of 2005 replayed many of the  same debates  that had come before.
Once  again, the basic, core principles  embraced by the Iraqi opposition  and
enshrined  in  the  TAL-Islam,  democracy,  federalism,  pluralism,  and
human  rights-continued  to  garner  support,  especially  from the  UIA  and
Kurdish  leaders  who  dominated  the drafting  process.53  Nonetheless,  the
participants  thoroughly  reargued  the  ways  in which  these basic  principles
would be  reflected  in  the  text.  Shi'i  leaders  pushed  again  to  strengthen
Islam's  formal  role  in Iraqi  governance;  they  also  sought to  add  language
recognizing  the  exalted  place  of  Shi'i  leaders  and  holy  sites.
Unsurprisingly,  these  efforts  provoked  strong  resistance  from  the  Kurds,
liberals,  and  secular  nationalists..  For  its  part,  the  United  States  lobbied
negotiators  to  ensure that  a  larger role  for Islam  would not  impinge  upon
religious freedom, women's rights, or an independent  Iraqi judiciary.
Islam was by  no means  the most  contentious  issue  in the constitutional
talks.  The  strongest  disagreements  concerned  the  status  and evolution  of
Iraqi  federalism,  and,  in  particular,  the  creation  of  new  federal  regions
outside  of  Iraqi  Kurdistan.  In  a  marked  shift  from  their  relative
ambivalence toward  federalism  during the  TAL  negotiations,  Shi'i leaders
(with  Kurdish  support)  now  publicly  insisted  on  the  right  to  form  new
federal  regions  of  their  own  in  Southern  Iraq.  This  created  a  direct
confrontation with the  Sunni representatives  and with nationalists like Iyad
'Allawi,  who argued that creating  oil-rich federal  regions  in  Southern  Iraq
would  leave  the  Sunni-dominated  center  without  natural  resources  of its
own.  Further  regionalization,  the  nationalists  feared,  would  lead  to  the
ultimate disintegration of a unified Iraqi state.54
Inexperienced,  unelected,  internally  divided, and politically  unrealistic in
their  own positions, the  Sunnis on the drafting body quickly alienated their
Shi'i and Kurdish colleagues.  Unlike the other leading drafters, the  Sunnis
had participated  in neither the TAL process nor the talks of the prewar Iraqi
51.  Indeed, Hammudi had  served as Deputy President of the INC's Executive Council in
the early  1990s.
52.  See Morrow, supra note 49, at 2.
53.  Indeed,  one  element  of  the  Shi'i-Kurd  agreement  to  form  a  national-unity
government  following  the  January  30  election  was  a  decision  to  base  the  permanent
constitution on the principles and institutional mechanisms  set forth in the TAL.
54.  For an elaboration of the Sunni position,  see Int'l Crisis Group, supra note  50,  at 6-
9.
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opposition.  They  were  both  newcomers  and  outsiders;  and  worse,  their
consent  was  not  necessary  to  reaching  a  deal.  Lacking  democratic
legitimacy  and a hierarchical  structure  capable of making commitments  on
behalf of their  community,  the  unelected  Sunnis  were  generally  kept  at
arm's length  during  the  substantive  drafting.  Indeed,  to the  extent  Sunni
influence  played  any role  in  the  process,  it  came  through  the  mediation
efforts of U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad.55
In  early  August  2005,  Hammudi  circulated  a unified  first  draft  of the
constitution,  which  compiled  different  sections  prepared  by  various  sub-
groups  of the  larger  committee.56  Despite  the  existence  of a  full  draft,
many  key  issues  remained  outstanding,  including  those  relating  to  Islam
and federalism.  Meanwhile,  the  August  15  drafting deadline  was  rapidly
approaching.  With  strong  encouragement  from  Khalilzad,  Iraqi  leaders
opted not to extend  the deadline  by six months, which the TAL  allowed  if
necessary. 57  Instead,  the  senior  Iraqi  leadership  agreed  to  press  forward
with  the  talks,  deciding  that  if  extra  time  was  needed,  they  would  take
advantage  of ambiguous  phrasing  in  the  TAL to  institute  a short  delay.58
As  time  grew  short,  the  Iraqis  bypassed  the  TNA  drafting  committee  in
favor  of  smaller,  ad  hoc  gatherings  of Shi'i  and  Kurdish  leaders.  With
Khalilzad's  facilitation,  the leading  factions  gradually  worked out  a  series
of compromises on key outstanding issues.  In order to complete their work,
55.  Khalilzad played an active  role in brokering compromises  in the constitutional  talks,
beginning shortly after his initial arrival in Baghdad in late July 2005.
56.  This essay makes  reference  to  two drafts put forward  in early August  by the  Shi'i-
dominated drafting  committee led by  Humam al-Hammudi. See Humam al-Hammudi,  et al.,
Draft  Constitution  (Aug.  7,  2005)  [hereinafter  Hammudi  Draft Const.  (Aug.  7,  2005)]  (on
file with the Fordham Law Review);  Humam al-Hammudi, et al.,  Draft Constitution  (Aug.  8,
2005)  [hereinafter  Hammudi  Draft  Const.  (Aug.  8,  2005)]  (on  file with  the Fordham  Law
Review).  These  drafts  were  significant  because  they  pre-dated  the  serious,  senior-level
constitutional  bargaining outside the committee.  As such, they reflect the strong influence  of
the  Shi'i  Islamist  parties,  which  were  able  to  control  the  drafting  process  within  the
committee.
57.  See TAL art. 61(F).
58.  Both Jonathan  Morrow  and the  International  Crisis  Group have  criticized  the U.S.
government for its effort to keep Iraqis to the August 15  deadline.  In their view, the deadline
should  have  been  extended  for  several  months  in  the  beginning  of August  2005.  See
Morrow, supra note 49, at 8-15; Int'l Crisis Group, supra  note 50,  at  1-5.  One of the authors
of this essay publicly  agreed with the criticism. See Noah Feldman, Agreeing to Disagree  in
Iraq, N.Y.  Times,  Aug.  30,  2005,  at A19.  At  the time,  senior U.S.  officials  believed that
extending  the  deadline  would  have  simply  postponed  the  serious  senior-level  political
negotiations  that  only  began  in  earnest  in  the  second  week  of August.  Moreover,  the
extension would  have lengthened the period of Sunni  exclusion from the democratic political
process (by requiring postponement of the December  2005 parliamentary  election until after
completion  of the  constitution),  without  providing  any  guarantee  that time  would  yield  a
compromise  acceptable  to  the  Sunnis.  Indeed,  to  the extent  that  Sunni  opposition  to  the
constitution  was premised on Shi'i  demands concerning  federalism,  there was virtually zero
chance  for  a mutually  acceptable  compromise,  since  these  demands  reflected  a  clear Shi'i
redline  in  the  discussions.  Instead  of invoking  a lengthy  formal  delay  under TAL Article
61(F),  American officials  encouraged  short, de  facto delays by supporting  continued debate
and  discussion  well  beyond  the  August  15  deadline.  Indeed,  as  noted  below,  final
amendments  to the draft were negotiated until just before the October  15 referendum.FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the TNA  leadership relied upon  a variety of legislative maneuvers allowing
for a series of short postponements of the deadline.
On  August  28,  Iraqi  leaders  announced  the  completion  of  a  final
constitution. 59  While some important  concessions had been made to  Sunni
leaders (largely at the urging of the United  States), the core of the  document
reflected  a political  deal between  the Shi'is and Kurds.  On federalism,  the
most important issue of all, the document  accepted the basic  Shi'i demand
to allow  for future regionalization. 60  Sunni leaders accordingly  denounced
the  charter,  launching  a  public  campaign  to  encourage  its  defeat  in  the
referendum scheduled  for October  15.  In protest, some  Sunnis even  talked
of  boycotting  the  referendum,  along  with  the  next  set  of parliamentary
elections that would follow in December.
In the weeks between  the  release  of the  final draft and the  referendum,
Khalilzad  met repeatedly with  leaders from all factions in order to broker a
last-ditch agreement.  His goal  was to convince the  Sunnis  not to end their
participation  in the very political process that they had only recently joined.
Days  before  the  vote,  the  Iraqis  announced  a  new  compromise,  in  which
they agreed to  form the Constitutional Review  Commission within the first
Parliament  to  be  elected  under  the  new  constitution.6 1  The  Commission
would  have  the  right  to prepare  proposals  for constitutional  amendments
which  could  subsequently  be  adopted  under  a  simplified,  expedited
ratification  procedure.  Ultimately,  the  last-minute  deal  allowed  secular
liberals  and some Sunnis to support the constitution's passage.
Despite  the  agreement,  the  final  constitution  only  barely  won  approval
under  the  ratification  procedures  set  forth  in  the  TAL.  In  the  Sunni-
dominated  provinces  of Anbar  and  Salah  ad-Din,  it  was  overwhelmingly
rejected  (by  over  ninety-six  percent  and  eighty-one  percent  of  voters,
respectively).62  In Ninewa,  too,  it  was  rejected  by  forty-five  percent  of
those  voting-but  not  by  the  two-thirds  margin  that,  under  TAL  Article
61(C),63  would  have  meant  the  constitution's  failure  overall.64   On
December  15,  two  months  after  the  referendum,  Iraq  held  its  next  set of
elections.  Despite their disappointment  over the constitution,  Sunni  Arabs
participated  in record  numbers.  Overall  turnout  was  seventy-six  percent,
59.  See Int'l Crisis Group, supra note 50, at 2.
60.  See Iraq Const. art.  112-17.
61.  Robert F. Worth, Leaders in Iraq Agree to Change in Constitution, N.Y. Times, Oct.
12,  2005, at Al.
62.  See Indep. Electoral  Comm'n of Iraq,  Certificate  of the  Constitutional Referendum
Final  Results (Oct. 25, 2005), available  at http://ieciraq.org/English/Frameset-english.htm.
63.  See TAL art. 61 (C).
64.  See Indep. Electoral  Comm'n of Iraq,  Certificate of the  Constitutional Referendum
Final  Results  (Oct.  25,  2005), available at http://ieciraq.org/English/Frameset-english.htm.
A  shift of 83,283  additional  votes against the constitution  in Ninewa would have  led to  its
rejection  under Article 61(C) of  the TAL.  Some have  argued that the last-minute agreement
to  add  the  Constitutional  Review  Commission  was  decisive  in  ensuring  passage  of the
constitution  by avoiding its defeat by the requisite  two-thirds margin in Ninewa.  For official
results in the constitutional referendum,  see id.
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and  Sunni political parties  won close  to  sixty of a total  275  seats.6 5  As of
this  writing,  the Constitutional  Review  Commission has  not  yet begun  its
work.
II.  THE TEXT
Iraq's  constitutional  text  embraces  the  basic  principles  of  Islam,
democracy,  human  rights, pluralism,  and federalism.  These  ideas  were  at
the  core  of a  political  consensus  among  the  leading  parties  of the  Iraqi
opposition, the Governing Council, and eventually the Transitional National
Assembly.  Despite  this general  agreement  among  Iraqi  leaders,  however,
the  precise  constitutional  phrasing,  institutional  mechanisms,  and  other
tradeoffs  across  the  basic  principles  were  the  subject  of hard  political
bargaining  and  debate.  On most  substantive  areas  of the  constitution-
particularly  those  relating  to the role of Islam  and the  strength  of Islamic
political  trends-the  discussions  pitted  Shi'i Islamist  politicians  against  a
loose coalition  of the Kurdish parties  and more  secular Arabs.66  For their
part, American  diplomats  generally  supported  this latter  group,  but above
all  sought  to  facilitate  agreements  across  the  factions  and  bring  the
negotiations to completion on schedule. 67  The final settlement reflected the
considerable  strength of the  Islamists,  who  led the  constitutional  drafting
effort following their victory in the December 2005 elections.68
65.  Indep.  Electoral  Comm'n  of Iraq, Certification  of the Council  of Representatives
Elections  Final  Results  1  (Feb.  10,  2006),  available  at
http://www.ieciraq.org/final%20cand/IECI-Decision_CertifiedResultsofCoRelectionsEn.
pdf; see also Robert  F. Worth,  Top Coalitions  Fall  Just Short in Iraq Voting,  N.Y. Times,
Jan. 21,  2006, at Al.
66.  This section refers repeatedly to these political groupings.  The most important  Shi'i
Islamists  engaged  in the  discussions  were the  senior  leaders  of the  Unified  Iraqi  Alliance
(UIA), including 'Abd  al-'Aziz  al-Hakim,  Vice President Adil 'Abd  al-Mahdi,  and Humam
Hammudi of SCIRI; Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari  and Nuri  al-Maliki of Da'wa; Nadim  al-
Jabiry  of the  Fadilah  Party;  Deputy  Prime Minister Ahmad  Chalabi;  Transitional  National
Authority  (TNA)  Deputy  Speaker  Hussein  al-Shahristani;  National  Security  Advisor
Mowaffaq  al-Rubaiee;  and  various  representatives  of Moktada  al-Sadr.  The  key  Kurdish
negotiators  included  Iraqi  President  Jalal  Talabani,  Kurdistan  Democratic  Party  (KDP)
leader  Mas'ud  Barzani,  Deputy  Prime  Minister  Rowsch  Shaways,  Minister  of Planning
Barham  Salih,  Minister  of Foreign  Affairs  Hoshyar  Zebari,  and  Constitutional  Drafting
Committee Deputy  Chairman  Fouad Masoum.  As for  the more  secular  Arabs,  the leading
figures were  former  Prime Minister Iyad  'Allawi,  President  Ghazi  al-Yawer, TNA  Speaker
Hachem  al-Hassani,  Drafting  Committee  Deputy  Chairman  Adnan  Janabi,  and  Adnan
Pachachi.  As previously noted, the Sunni Arab bloc of representatives  added to the Drafting
Committee  from  outside  the National  Assembly were  not especially  significant  in  shaping
constitutional outcomes outside of the federalism discussion.  The leading  Sunni negotiators
included  Saleh Mutlaq and  'Abd al-Nasir al-Janabi  of the National Dialogue  Council, Tariq
al-Hashimi and Ayad al-Sammarae of the Iraqi Islamic Party, Mahmoud al-Mashhadani,  and
Adnan Dulaimi.
67.  On the ethics of American diplomatic engagement on Iraqi constitutional  issues,  see
Feldman, supra note 12.
68.  Consider that beyond the  Preamble,  fourteen of the constitution's  139 total articles
make direct or indirect reference  to  Islam or religious  values. Iraq Const. pmbl. & arts.  2,  3,
7, 10,  12,  14,  29, 35,  39, 40, 41,43, 48, 89.FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
This section analyzes  the key  constitutional  provisions which will  shape
the  role  of  Islamic  law,  values,  and  politics  in  Iraq's  developing
constitutional  order.69  In  doing  so,  it examines  the  final  text against  the
backdrop  of both the TAL  (which  provided a more  limited  role  for Islam
than  the  permanent  charter)  and  original  proposals  put  forward  by  the
religious  Shi'i  parties. 70   Ultimately,  the  text  reflects  a  series  of
compromises  establishing  the  basic  structures  of  an  Islamic  democracy
while also allowing for the emergence of a wide range of interpretations and
practice.  The constitutional text alone does not precisely or fully define the
relationship  between  Islam  and  democracy;  this  relationship  will
accordingly  develop  over  time,  and  is  likely  to  be  shaped  as  much  by
subsequent political  developments as by the text itself.
A.  State and Religion
The most contentious  debate over Islam's place in the  Iraqi constitution
concerned  the  precise  phrasing  of  Article  2,  dealing  with  the  formal
relationship  between  Islam  and the  state.  The  relevant  section  reads  as
follows:
First:  Islam is  the official  religion of the State  and  it  is a fundamental
source of legislation.
A.  No law that contradicts  the established provisions of Islam may be
established.
B.  No  law  that  contradicts  the  principles  of  democracy  may  be
established.
C.  No law that contradicts the rights and basic freedoms  stipulated in
this constitution may be established.
Second:  This Constitution  guarantees  the Islamic  identity of the majority
of the Iraqi people ....  71
As  a general  matter,  this  language  parallels  TAL  Article  7,  with  some
subtle changes  strengthening Islam's prominence in the constitution.72  This
shift  reflects  the  more  powerful  hand  of the  Shi'i  Islamist  parties  in  the
constitutional  discussions.  Nonetheless,  it  does  not  establish  clear
69.  For  article-by-article  examinations  of the  permanent  constitution,  see  Nathan  J.
Brown,  Carnegie  Endowment  for  Int'l Peace,  The  Final  Draft  of the  Iraqi  Constitution:
Analysis  and  Commentary  (Sept.  16,  2005)  available  at
http://www.camegieendowment.org/files/FinalDraftSeptl6.pdf  and  U.S.  Comm'n  on  Int'l
Religious  Freedom  (USCIRF),  Iraq's  Permanent  Constitution:  Analysis  &
Recommendations  (Mar.  2006),  available  at  http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/region/
middleast/iraq/03212006_iraq.html.
70.  The best article-by-article  examinations of the TAL can be found  in Istrabadi, supra
note 43, and Nathan  J. Brown, Transitional Administrative  Law:  Commentary  and Analysis
(Mar.  7-8,  2004),  available  at  http://www.geocities.com/nathanbrownt/
interimiraqiconstitution.html
71.  Iraq Const. art. 2.
72.  See TAL art. 7.  On the negotiations over this provision in the TAL,  see Bremer with
McConnell,  supra  note 30, at 292,  298-99.
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guidelines  on  precisely  how  the  Iraqi  regime  will  rely  upon  Islam  and
Islamic  values  in  everyday  governance.  Several  particular  features  of
Article  2  deserve elaboration.
First, like the Iraqi constitutions  of 1925,  1958,  and  1970 before it-and
indeed, like virtually every other Arab constitution-Iraq's  charter formally
makes Islam the state religion. 73  This decision was entirely uncontroversial
in the negotiations.  Indeed, the  Iraqi opposition  had accepted this principle
years  earlier,  at  the  Salah  ad-Din  conference  in  1992,  and  the  IGC  had
incorporated  it without sustained comment or debate in the TAL.74
Second,  Article  2  identifies  Islam  as  "a  fundamental  source"  of
legislation. 75  This  language  goes  a half-step  beyond  the  TAL  (in  which
Islam was  merely "a  source" of legislation), 76 but not as far as the original
Shi'i demand that Islam be "the source"  of legislation. 77  The importance  of
this provision may well be chiefly symbolic, as it will lend moral support to
Iraqi politicians who wish to make explicitly religious arguments in favor of
proposed  legislation. 7 8  The  compromise  formulation  is  designed  to avoid
any implication, however, that Islam is the only source of law.
Third,  Article  2  contains  a noncontradiction  clause  barring  laws which
contravene  Islam's  "established  provisions."79   The  TAL  contained  a
similar clause, which the Shi'i Islamists demanded at the time in exchange
for changing  "the source"  to "a  source"  in the previous  sentence.80  In the
debate  over the permanent  constitution, the  Islamists  sought to strengthen
the  language  beyond the  TAL  formulation.  They  did so by replacing  the
TAL's restriction on laws violating the "provisions of Islam on which there
is consensus"  (thawabit al-islam al-mujma'  'alayha) with one barring laws
violating  "the  provisions  of the  principles  of Islam"  (thawabit ahkam al-
73.  Nathan  J.  Brown,  Carnegie  Endowment  for  Int'l  Peace,  Debating  Islam  in  Post-
Baathist  Iraq  2  (Mar.  2005),  available  at
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/PO13.Brown.FINAL2.pdf.
74.  INCArticles ofAssociation, supra note 17,  art.  1; TAL art. 7.
75.  Iraq Const. art. 2.
76.  TAL  art. 7(A).
77.  See Hammudi Draft Const. (Aug. 7, 2005), supra note 56, at  1.
78.  See Brown, supra  note  73, at 3-4.
79.  Iraq Const. art.  2.
80.  Istrabadi,  supra note  43,  at  277.  The  evolution  of this language  during  the  TAL
negotiations  may  have  been  influenced  by  U.S.  acquiescence  to  similar  language  in  the
Afghan  Constitution.  See  Afg.  Const.  art.  3  (2004),  available  at
http://www.jemb.org/eng/Legal%20Framework/Legislation%20oP/o20Reference/Constitutio
n/Constitution%20(English).pdf  (unofficial  English  translation).  In  December,  the  TAL
drafting  committee (including  its  Shi'i Islamist  members) tentatively  agreed to language  on
Islam that did not include  a noncontradiction  clause.  Meanwhile,  on January  4, the Afghan
loya jirga formally  approved  a new  constitution,  which  included  the  statement,  "No  law
shall contradict  the tenets  and provisions of the holy  religion of Islam  in Afghanistan."  Id.
The  Afghan  constitution  was  formally  signed  and  enacted  into  law  by  President  Hamid
Karzai on  January  26, 2004.  Several  days  later,  Shi'i Islamists on  the drafting committee
began discussing  the possible addition of a noncontradiction  clause  to the TAL,  and SCIRI
put it forward  as a formal demand on February 21.  Ironically  enough, the lead U.S. diplomat
involved  in the Afghan  constitutional discussions  was  Ambassador  Zalmay Khalilzad,  who
would  subsequently play the same  role in the Iraqi constitutional process  the following year.FORDHAM  LA W REVIEW
islam).81   With  its  reference  to  ahkam-which  may  be  rendered  as
"judgments"  as well  as "principles"-the  new  language  has  stronger  legal
connotations  than  did  its  predecessor.82  It  may therefore  be  more  easily
invoked  by the  Federal  Supreme  Court  in  striking  down  statutes  deemed
incompatible  with  Islam,  or  by  legislators  arguing  against  such  laws  in
Parliament.  Overall,  however,  the  noncontradiction  clause  is  highly
indeterminate.  There  is, needless  to say,  no clear  shared understanding  of
what constitutes "the provisions of the principles of Islam."
Paralleling  Article  2's  noncontradiction  clause  on  Islam  are  two  other
non-contradiction  clauses,  barring  laws  which  violate  the  "principles  of
democracy"  and  "the  rights  and  basic  freedoms  stipulated  in  this
constitution." 83  Elsewhere,  the constitution  makes clear  that it  is  supreme
over  ordinary  federal  or  local  statutes. 84  The  liberal  drafters  of  these
provisions  sought  to  emphasize  that  democracy  and  human  rights  are  as
fundamental  to  the  constitution  as  Islam.  Indeed,  the  parallel
noncontradiction  clauses  in this provision were  a  core  part of the political
compromise  on  the  role  of Islam  in  the  TAL.85  The  Kurds  and  secular
Arabs-with backing  from the  United States-managed  to  head  off Shi'i
Islamist  attempts  to  remove  these  parallel  clauses  from  the  permanent
constitution.86  As a practical matter, these clauses  raise the possibility that
future  interpretations  of  the  Islamic  noncontradiction  clause  would  be
influenced  by the principles of democracy,  whatever these  may  be  defined
to  constitute.  In  any  case,  it  cannot  be  maintained  that  the  text  of the
constitution  privileges  Islam  over  basic  rights  or  democratic  principles,
however  uneasily  they  might  sit  beside  each  other  under  certain
circumstances.
Finally, Article  2 "guarantees  the  Islamic  identity  of the majority of the
Iraqi people." 87  This language  is also an adaptation of the TAL, which  had
established  "respect"  for Iraq's  Muslim  majority. 88  The  change  in  verb
from "respect" to "guarantee"  reflects the stronger hand of the Shi'i Islamist
81.  Compare TAL art.  7(A),  with  Iraq  Const. art. 2(I)(A).  The translation  here  is the
authors'  and  differs  slightly  from  the  English  translations  of  these  documents  cited
elsewhere.  The  CPA translation  of TAL  Article  7(a)  makes  reference  to  the  "universally
agreed tenets of Islam,"  and the Independent Electoral  Commission of Iraq (IECI) translation
of Article  2(l)(a)  in  the  permanent  constitution  refers  to  "the  established  provisions  of
Islam." See TAL art. 7(A), available  at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/govemment/TAL.html;  Iraq
Const.  art.  2(1)(A),  available  at
http://www.ieciraq.org/final%20cand/ConstitutionEng-UNs-  13.pdf.
82.  See Brown, supra note 69, at 3.
83.  Iraq Const. art. 2(l)(B)-(C).
84.  Id.  art. 13.
85.  See TAL  art. 7(A); Bremer with McConnell, supra  note 30,  at 299.
86.  See Hammudi  Draft Const. (Aug.  7,  2005), supra note  56,  at  1.  The  Shi'i Islamists
did,  however,  succeed  in  splitting  the  three  noncontradiction  clauses  into  separate
subsections  of Article  2(1),  instead  of retaining  the  clauses  in  a  single  sentence,  as  in  the
TAL.  Compare Iraq Const. art. 2(1), with TAL art. 7.
87.  Iraq Const. art. 2(2).
88.  TAL art.  7(A).
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parties  in  the  negotiations  and  arguably  enhances  the  constitution's
symbolic embrace of Islam.
Beyond Article  2,  the most  contentious  constitutional  provision  directly
relating  to Islam's formal  status in Iraqi  law is Article  39, which states that
"Iraqis  are  free  in their  commitment  to  their  personal  status  according  to
their  re-*igions,  sects,  beliefs,  or  choices  and  that  shall  be  regulated  by
law." 89  The provision  is not  clearly worded, but its  intent  was to  change
Iraq's  approach  to  laws  governing  personal  status  (governing  marriage,
divorce, inheritance,  etc.).  In 1959,  a newly installed Iraqi military regime
enacted  a new  personal-status  law,  drawing  eclectically  from  a variety  of
Sunni and Shi'i schools of Islamic jurisprudence,  which would apply  to all
Iraqis via the civil courts. 90  The law was then-and remains--enormously
controversial,  in  particular  among  leading  Shi'i clerics.  The  critics  have
objected  to  its  patchwork  embrace  of  disparate  elements  of  different
jurisprudential  traditions,  its multiple departures  from  Islamic shari'a,  and
its reliance on a Sunni-dominated judiciary  for enforcement.
In  December  2003,  the  Iraqi  Governing  Council  (under  the  monthly
rotating  presidency  of SCIRI  leader  'Abd  al-'Aziz  al-Hakim)  passed  a
resolution purporting to  abolish the  1959 personal-status law and replace  it
with  shari'a. 91  This  initiative  was  controversial  inside  Iraq, particularly
with  women who  preferred the  1959 law's relatively  progressive  approach
to  divorce  and  inheritance.  At the  time,  Bremer refused  to  give  the  IGC
resolution any legal force.  Several  months later, the IGC voted to repeal  its
decision.92  The original law remained in effect, and  the Shi'i Islamists did
not attempt to incorporate Islamic personal-status  law in the TAL.
In 2005,  the Shi'i Islamists  again  sought  to  replace the  1959  code with
shari'a,  this time through the  new constitution.  The religious  parties were
politically  much  stronger  than  before,  and  the  Kurds  and  Iyad  'Allawi
proved unsuccessful  in their bid to keep personal-status issues outside of the
constitution  entirely.  The final language of Article 39, however, did reflect
an  important compromise.  Instead of merely replacing the  1959  code with
shari'a,  as  originally proposed  by  the Islamists,  the  provision  emphasized
that every Iraqi  would have freedom to  choose their personal-status  law in
accordance  with "their religions, sects, beliefs, or choices."93  This phrasing
89.  Iraq Const. art. 39.
90.  On the history of personal-status  law in Iraq and the controversy sparked by the new
1959  law,  see  Feldman,  supra note  12,  at  108-11;  Kristen  A.  Stilt, Islamic Law and the
Making and Remaking of the Iraqi Legal System,  36  Geo. Wash.  Int'l L.  Rev. 695,  748-54
(2004); Brown, supra note 73,  at 4-7.
91.  One of the most  vocal Shi'i  critics of the  1959 law, the cleric  Mohammed  Bahr al-
Ulum, who had published a searing critique in  196,  was a member of the IGC at the time.
92.  This repeal came  at an unexpected moment  to most IGC members and the CPA-in
the  midst  of the  final,  tense  days  of the  TAL  negotiations.  See  Bremer  with  McConnell,
supra  note 30, at 293.
93.  Iraq  Const.  art.  39.  The  Hammudi  Draft  Constitution  circulated  on  August  7
stipulated  that "the  followers  of every  religion  or sect are  free in ...  their commitment  to
their  personal  status  in  accordance  with  their  religious  and  sectarian  beliefs."  HammudiFORDHAMLA WREVIEW
sought  explicitly  to  ensure  not  only  that  Shi'is,  Sunnis,  and  Christians
would  be  able  to  follow their  own  faith  traditions,  but  that  secular  Iraqis
would  retain  the  option  of following  the  1959  civil  code  on  matters  of
personal  status.  Article  39 also declared  that  the provision  would require
implementing  legislation,94  thereby  providing  an  additional  check  on  the
modalities  by  which  Islamic  personal-status  law  will be  incorporated  and
applied.
As with  other key provisions  dealing with the role of Islam, it remains  to
be seen how Article  39 will be implemented in practice.  The most obvious
danger is that the freedom to choose one's own personal-status  legal regime
will  remain  illusory,  especially  for  women  who  are  intimidated  into
"choosing"  shari'a  and thereby  casting  aside  important  protections of the
1959  code.  That  said,  a wide range  of interpretations  of the provision  are
possible, as it contains no clear statement of what version(s) of shari'a  will
be applied,  how,  and by whom, nor what would happen  in case  of conflict
between  couples  over  which  law  ought to  be  applied.95  Here  again,  the
constitutional text  does not definitively determine  the relationship  between
Islam and the Iraqi state.
In addition to  Articles  2  and 39, there  are numerous  other constitutional
provisions reaffirming  the  important  role of religion  in Iraqi society.  Such
provisions-acknowledging  "God's  due  over  us,' 9 6  recognizing  the
importance  of national religious  leaders,97 affirming Iraq's  membership  in
the  Islamic  world,98 and giving  affirmative  protection  to  holy  shrines  and
religious  sites 99 -were  absent  from  the  TAL.  Most  were  included  in  the
permanent text at the  initiative of the Shi'i Islamist political parties.  While
all  factions  agreed  to  the  final  language,  early  proposals  reflected  a  clear
sectarian  Shi'i bent.  At  one point,  for example,  the  Shi'i  Islamist  parties
had  drafted  language  referring  to  Iraq's  "Shi'i  majority"  and  to  the
importance  of the  Shi'i  "marja'iyya"  in  Najaf.1 00  Unsurprisingly,  these
provisions  were  strongly  opposed  by  Sunni  and  Kurdish  members  of the
Constitutional Drafting Committee.  In the end, the Shi'i Islamists agreed to
drop  these  demands,  reportedly  following  consultations  with  Sistani
himself.  The  symbolic  provisions  that  remain  in  the  constitution  may  or
may not have any practical  significance.  In any event, they reflect the deep
Draft Const.  (Aug.  7,  2005), supra note  56,  at  9.  This  language  was  intended  to  impose
shari'a  on Muslims.  See id.
94.  Iraq Const. art. 39.  Indeed, as Nathan Brown has pointed out, Article 39 leaves  open
whether  (for those  choosing  the  shari'a option),  the  law  will  be  applied  by  civil  courts,
religious courts, or some combination  of both. See Brown, supra note  69, at 7.
95.  See Isobel  Coleman,  Women,  Islam, and the New Iraq, 85  Foreign  Aff.  24,  24-38
(2006)
96.  Iraq Const. pmbl.
97.  Id.
98.  Id. art. 3.
99.  Id. art. 10.
100.  Hammudi Draft Const. (Aug. 7, 2005), supra  note 56,  at 1-2.
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desire  of  Iraq's  Shi'i  leaders  to  emphasize  the  integration  of religious
commitments and values into the country's political order.
B.  Rights and Duties
Section  two  of Iraq's constitution  sets  forth an  extensive  list of "Rights
and  Liberties,"  covering  civil,  political,  economic,  cultural,  and  social
freedoms. 1 1  This  section  of the  constitution  was  not  a  source  of major
controversy during the negotiations. 102  However, three important issues did
prove contentious-the  individual right to freedom of religion, the scope  of
women's  rights,  and  the  recognition  of  Iraq's  obligations  under
international  human-rights  treaties.  Islamist politics  played the  key  role in
shaping  the debate on these  issues.  In each  area,  Shi'i Islamists sought to
cut back on the  breadth  of freedoms  guaranteed  by  the TAL.  Ultimately,
the Islamists failed in this effort, largely due to the strong  opposition of the
Kurds and secular Arabs (backed strongly by the United States).  Yet, while
the final constitution contains strong protections for individual rights across
the  board,  it  remains  to  be  seen  how  these  rights  will  be  enforced  in
practice-especially  if they  are  perceived  as  conflicting  with  Article  2's
embrace of Islamic values.
All  Iraqis  engaged  in  the  constitutional  negotiations  believed  in  the
importance of protecting group rights to religious freedom.  All recognized
that  the  Ba'thist  dictatorship  had  unjustly  persecuted  and  manipulated
various  religious  communities  (including,  above  all,  the  Iraqi  Shi'i
community),  and  all  agreed  that  the  constitution  should  prevent  future
governments  from  interfering  with  any  group's  right  to  affirmatively
practice  its particular religious tradition.  The constitution includes multiple,
redundant guarantees of such rights.1 0 3
The  individual  right  to  religious  freedom,  by  contrast,  was  much  more
controversial.  Such an individual  right implies  the right not to  be religious
at all-or, even more problematic  from an Islamic perspective,  the right to
convert from Islam to other faiths.  The Shi'i Islamists sought to scale back
the  TAL's  fairly  extensive  protection  of  individual  religious  freedom.
Whereas TAL Article 7 had guaranteed the full rights "of all individuals"  to
freedom of religious belief and practice, 1 04 the Islamists proposed changing
the  parallel  clause  in  the  permanent  constitution  to  protect  the  right  "of
101.  Iraq Const. arts.  14-44.
102.  Indeed, the rights protected in section two largely mirror those enshrined in the TAL.
See TAL arts.  10-23.  The  only difference,  as some commentators have noted,  is the addition
of language in the permanent constitution which appears  to exercise the condition of certain
rights on their compatibility  with "public  morals," and also the requirement of implementing
legislation.  See, e.g., Iraq Const. arts.  15-17,  22-24, 27, 30-32, 36; Brown, supra note 69,  at
5-6.  The  danger  that  these  qualifications  may  limit  the  scope  of  individual  liberties  is
mitigated, however, by article  44 of the constitution, which makes clear that such  legislation
may not "violate the essence of the right or the freedom"  at issue. Iraq Const. art. 44.
103.  See, e.g., Iraq Const. arts. 2,  7, 41(1), 41(2).
104.  See TAL art. 7.FORDHAMLAWREVIEW
all . . . religions"  to  freedom  of belief and  practice. 1 0 5  Moreover,  while
retaining  the  TAL  ban  on  religious  coercion  of individuals,  the  Islamists
also  proposed  eliminating  the  individual  right  to  "freedom  of  thought,
conscience, and religious  belief and practice."'106
These  efforts  ultimately  failed,  as  Iraq's  Kurdish  and  secular  parties
effectively  resisted  the  Shi'i  Islamist  proposals.  The  United  States  also
played  an  important  role  in  urging  the  Shi'is  to  comnpromise  on  these
demands.  President Bush personally called SCIRI  leader 'Abd  al-'Aziz  al-
Hakim-the  one  time  he  personally  intervened  in  the  constitutional
negotiations-in  part  to  register  his  own  hope  that  the  new  constitution
would not restrict religious freedom.107  The  final constitution  restored the
TAL  language  protecting  "the  full  religious  rights  of all  individuals  to
freedom  of  religious  belief  and  practice."' 08   It  also  included  a  clear
statement  that  "[e]ach  individual  shall  have  the  freedom  of  thought,
conscience and belief."1 09
A  second  contentious  set  of issues  concerned  the  scope  of women's
rights.  Both  the  TAL  and  Iraq's  final  constitution  contain  general
guarantees  of  full  equality  for  women.11 0  In  neither  case  were  these
equality  provisions  controversial  among  the  Iraqi  drafters.  Initially,
however, the Shi'i Islamist parties did resist incorporating  one of the TAL's
central  innovations  on women's  rights-the requirement  that the electoral
law "shall  aim to achieve the goal of having women constitute  no less than
one-quarter  of  the  members  of  the  National  Assembly""I '-in  the
permanent  constitution.  Adnan  Pachachi  and  the  Kurdish  parties  had
insisted  on  including  this  provision  in  the  TAL; 112 it  resulted  in  an  Iraqi
Parliament  containing  eighty-six  women (out of 275  total members).  The
Islamists  originally sought  to remove the requirement  altogether.11 3  When
the  Kurds  and  secularists  objected,  the  Islamists then  sought to phase  out
the quota after the first two election cycles. 114  This too failed.  Finally, the
Islamists  relented,  agreeing  to  incorporate  the  quota,  word-for-word  from
the TAL, in Article 47 of the final constitution.
1 5
105.  Hammudi Draft Const. (Aug. 7, 2005), supra note 56, at  1-2.
106.  Compare TAL art. 13(F),  with Hammudi Draft Const. (Aug. 7,  2005), supra note 56,
at  1-2.
107.  See  Dexter  Filkins  &  James  Glanz,  Shiites and Kurds Halt Charter Talks  with
Sunnis, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 2005, at Al.
108.  Iraq Const. art. 2.
109.  Id.  art. 40.
110.  See TAL art. 12; Iraq Const. art. 14.
111.  TAL art. 30(C).
112.  Diamond, supra note 43, at  156; Istrabadi, supra note 43,  at 294.  The Iraqi electoral
law implementing  the quota requirement  specified that at least every third candidate on each
political  entity's  candidate  list  be  a  woman.  The  overall  distribution  of seats across  the
various  lists  ultimately  resulted  in  a  Parliament  comprised  of thirty-one  percent  women,
thereby surpassing the twenty-five percent target. See Istrabadi, supra note 43, at 295.
113.  See Hammudi Draft Const. (Aug. 7, 2005), supra note 56.
114.  See Hammudi Draft Const. (Aug. 8, 2005), supra note 56, at 40.
115.  See Iraq Const. art. 47.
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In early  drafts  of the  constitution,  the  Shi'i  Islamists  also  introduced  a
provision  addressing  the  public  and  private  role  of  women  in  Iraqi
society.116  As originally phrased, it read as follows:
The  State  shall  guarantee  reconciliation  between  [a]  woman's  role
towards her family  and her work in society, and her equality  with men in
the  life  fields of politics, social  affairs,  culture, and  economics  in  a way
that does not contradict the fundamental principles of this constitution. 
1 1 7
Iraqi liberals  objected overwhelmingly  to this provision,  which they feared
would  condition  women's  equality  on  its  compatibility  with  Islamic  law.
The  United  States  echoed  these  objections.  Ultimately,  the  Islamists
dropped the provision from the text entirely.
A  final  area  of contention  in  the  constitution's  treatment  of individual
freedom  was  the  extent  to  which  the  charter  would  commit  Iraq  to
respecting  international  human-rights  conventions.  As  various  scholars
have  noted,  many  newly  drafted  constitutions  have  strengthened  the
domestic  status of human rights by referencing  international  law and treaty
obligations.1 8  International  human-rights  advocates  have enthusiastically
embraced  this  strategy,  which  also  helps  transitioning  countries  position
themselves  as responsible members of the international  community. 119  The
TAL itself had taken this approach,  declaring that the  Iraqi people  enjoyed
"the  rights  stipulated  in  international  treaties  and  agreements,  other
instruments  of international  law  that  Iraq has  signed  and to  which  it  has
acceded,  and  others  that  are  deemed  binding  on  it."'120  These  treaties
included  both  the  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights
(ICCPR)  and  the  Convention  on  the  Elimination  of  All  Forms  of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).12'
116.  Hammudi Draft Const. (Aug. 7, 2005), supra  note 56,  at 5.
117.  Id.
118.  See,  e.g.,  Thomas  Buergenthal,  Modern Constitutions and Human Rights Treaties,
36  Colum.  J.  Transnat'l  L.  211,  214-15  (1998);  cf  Andrew  Moravcsik,  The  Origins of
Human Rights Regimes:  Democratic  Delegation in Postwar  Europe, 54 Int'l Org. 217, 217-
20 (2000).
119.  Feldman, supra  note  37, at 867-75.
120.  TAL art. 23.  In addition, the TAL preamble affirmed  the Iraqi people's "respect for
international  law"  and highlighted  Iraq's participation in  founding the United Nations. Id. at
pmbl.  The preamble was drafted by Pachachi  aide Feisel Istrabadi,  who would later serve as
Iraq's  Deputy  Representative  to  the  United  Nations.  Pachachi  himself  is  a  committed
internationalist,  and had  served as Iraq's  Representative  to the  U.N. in  the  1960s.  On  the
TAL's  embrace  of international  law,  see  Diamond,  supra note  43,  at  146,  and  Istrabadi,
supra note 43, at 289.
121.  Iraq  ratified  the  International  Covenant  on  Civil and  Political  Rights  (ICCPR)  on
March  23,  1976,  without  submitting  any  reservations  or  declarations.  It  ratified  the
Convention on the  Elimination of All Forms  of Discrimination  Against Women (CEDAW)
on August  13,  1986,  but submitted several reservations seeking to protect the role of shari'a,
in  spite  of the  treaty  provisions  mandating  gender  equality.  See Office  of the  U.N.  High
Comm'r  for Human  Rights,  Status  of Ratifications  of the  Principal  International  Human
Rights  Treaties  (June  9,  2004), available at http://www.unhcr.ch/pdf/report.pdf;  USCIRF,
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In  the  debate  over  the  permanent  constitution,  however,  the  Shi'i
Islamists  sought  to  limit  the  scope  of Iraq's  international  human-rights
commitments.  Initially,  they  proposed  narrowing  the  TAL  provision  to
apply only to human-rights treaties and agreements  "that Iraq has ratified,"
and  not  to  international  law  more  broadly.122  Moreover,  the  proposed
revision incorporated  only those rights "that  do not contradict the principles
and  rulings of this  constitution." 123  These  changes  aimed  to  subordinate
international  human rights  to Article  2's elevation of Islam.124  At the  last
minute,  however,  the  Iraqis  dropped  the  revised  provision  from  the text
entirely.  Nonetheless,  Article  8  retained  weaker,  more  generic  language
declaring  that "Iraq  shall ...  respect  its international  obligations."' 125  This
formulation  presumably extends  to the international  rights treaties that Iraq
has signed.
In  each  of  the  areas  examined  above-religious  freedom,  women's
rights,  and  international  human  rights-Shi'i  Islamists  made  concerted
efforts to restrict or qualify the protection of individual liberties, largely out
of a desire to ensure the primacy of Islamic values.  In each case, they were
largely  unsuccessful.  Nonetheless,  Article  2's  noncontradiction  clause
(and,  more  generally,  its  embrace  of  Islam  as  a  source  of  law)  are
potentially  in  tension  with  the  constitution's  sweeping  guarantees  of
individual  freedom.  The constitutional text does not explicitly  resolve this
tension,  which will be  left  to  Iraqi  legislators  and judges  to address  in  the
future.
C.  Separation  of  Powers
The  debate  over the  institutional  structure  of the  federal  government-
and,  in  particular,  the  balance  of authority  between  the  President,  Prime
Minister,  and  National  Assembly--did  not  explicitly  address  the  role  of
Islam.  Nonetheless,  the  constitutional  settlement  in  this  area  was
profoundly  influenced by the politics of religion and denomination.  Indeed,
the central  question in the debate was the extent to which the Shi'i Islamist
political  parties  would be  constrained,  within  Iraq's  emerging  democratic
constitutional  framework,  by  counter-majoritarian  checks  and  balances.
Shi'i  Islamists  pushed  for  strong  parliamentary  supremacy,  with  few
institutional  restraints.  The  Kurds  and secular  Arabs,  meanwhile,  argued
for  a  strong  President  to  counter  the  Prime  Minister  and for  institutional
mechanisms  that  would  balance  against  Shi'i  Islamist  majonitanianism.
Ultimately,  the Islamists were generally  successful in their efforts, but only
122.  Hammudi Draft Const. (Aug. 7, 2005), supra note 56,  at 10.
123.  Id.
124.  Indeed, one Islamist politician told U.S.  officials  he was concerned that without the
changes,  Iraq's  international  treaty  obligations  could  force  the  country  to  legalize
homosexuality, in violation of Islamic law.
125.  Iraq Const. art. 8.
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after  making  important  concessions  concerning  institutional  arrangements
in the short term.
From the beginning, all Iraqi factions agreed that Iraq's new government
would  derive  its  authority  directly  from  the  people.  The  constitution
declares this principle multiple times in its opening provisions.  Even before
Article  2's recognition  of the  importance  of Islam,  Article  1 asserts  Iraq's
"republican,  representative  (Parliamentary),  democratic  and  federal"
character. 126  Article  5 goes on to  declare that "[t]he  law is sovereign,"  and
that  in Iraq  "[t]he  people  are  the  source  of authorities  and  its  legitimacy,
which the people  shall exercise  in a direct  general secret ballot and through
their  constitutional  institutions." 127  To  stress the  point  further,  Article  6
adds  that  the  "[t]ransfer  of  authority  shall  be  made  peacefully  through
democratic  means." 128  More  practically,  the  constitution  later  lodges  the
overwhelming  bulk  of  political  authority  in  the  elected  National
Assembly.
129
At the same  time  as they  embraced  democracy,  however,  Iraqi leaders
also  recognized  the  need  to  balance  majority  rule  with  institutional  and
structural protections for minorities.  The INC political statement from  1992
had  stressed the importance of pluralism alongside  democracy,  and  indeed
the  INC's  formal leadership  structure  called for a three-man  Office  of the
Presidency,  including  a  President  and  two  Vice  Presidents,  that  would
include  representatives  from  each  of Iraq's  major  communities. 13 0  The
IGC's  rotating  nine-man  presidency  (five  Shi'is,  two  Sunnis,  and  two
Kurds)  also reflected this  commitment  to pluralism,  as  did  its  decision to
require  unanimity  and  consensus  during  the  TAL  drafting  process.
Throughout  both  the  TAL  and  permanent  constitutional  discussions,
moreover,  there  was  a  virtually  unquestioned  assumption  that Iraq  would
have a largely  ceremonial  President,  a  more powerful  Prime Minister,  and
that both of these  offices would  be chosen  by an elected Parliament.  The
assumption  among  Iraqi  political  leaders  was  that  these  posts-together
with the  Speakership  of the National Assembly-would  be divided  among
the major communities,  to ensure representation  for each at the most senior
levels of the Iraqi government.
Within these  broad  outlines,  however,  there  was  considerable  room  for
disagreement  over  specifics.  The  most  important  of  these  debates
concerned  the  structure  of  the  Presidency,  the  process  by  which  the
President and Prime Minister would be selected, and the relative authorities
of each office.  Here  again,  it is useful  to  examine  the final  constitutional
126.  Iraq Const. art.  1.
127.  Id. art. 5.
128.  Id. art. 6.
129.  See id. arts. 46-62.
130.  See INC Articles of Association, supra note  17,  arts.  11,  20; see also id. arts.  1 (on
the  value of pluralism),  16  (establishing  a President  and three  Vice  Presidents  to  lead  the
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settlement  in  light  of  the  TAL  and  early  proposals  for  the  permanent
charter.
The  TAL  executive  framework  established  a  Presidency  Council,
consisting of a President  and two Deputy Presidents,  that would  be  chosen
on  a  unified  ticket  by  a  two-thirds  supermajority  of  the  National
Assembly. 131  In  addition  to  performing  general  ceremonial  duties,  the
Presidency  Council  had the right to veto  proposed legislation  (subject to a
two-thirds  override by  the National  Assembly)  and to  appoint members of
the  Federal  Supreme  Court  (subject  to  the  recommendation  of judicial
experts  on  Iraq's Higher Juridical  Council). 132  Perhaps  most  importantly,
however,  the  Presidency Council would  appoint Iraq's Prime  Minister, the
most powerful  figure in the government.133  This arrangement  ensured that
the  leadership  posts-including  the  Presidency  Council  and  Prime
Minister-would  be  negotiated  as  a  package,  and  would  effectively  be
subject  to  the  same  two-thirds  majority  requirement  for  approval.  All
Presidency  Council decisions,  including those noted above, would  be made
unanimously.' 34   Overall,  the  TAL  executive  structure  embedded  the
principle of cross-communal  consensus in Iraq's transitional political order.
Chafing  at  these  constraints  on  their  parliamentary  majority,  the  Shi'i
Islamist  parties  sought to  eliminate  many of these  institutional  checks  and
balances  when  negotiating  the  permanent  constitution.  In particular,  they
sought  to  replace  the  Presidency  Council  with  a  single  President,  to  be
elected by  majority vote  of the Parliament. 135  They hoped  to weaken  the
already weak  presidential authorities  set  forth in the  TAL even further, by
eliminating its veto power and role  in appointing members of the  Supreme
Court.  They also sought to limit the President to a single term in office. 136
Most  importantly,  they denied  the  President  any  discretion  in  naming  the
Prime Minister,  who would  be constitutionally  required  to  come  from the
largest  electoral  bloc  within  the  Parliament. 137  These  proposed  changes
would have marked a clear  departure  from the pluralist, consensual  model
established  in  the  TAL.  Effectively,  they  would  have  ensured  that  the
slimmest of parliamentary  majorities-such  as  the  one  the  Shi'i  Islamists
enjoyed  in the Transitional  National Assembly-would be able to rule  Iraq
with few formal institutional constraints.
Unsurprisingly,  the  Kurds  and  secular  Arabs  resisted  Shi'i  Islamist
efforts  in the arena of executive  structure.  Ultimately,  the final constitution
arrived  at  a unique  compromise.  It  created  two  separate  frameworks  for
131.  See TAL, art. 36(A).
132.  Id. arts. 37, 39(B), 39(C), 44(E).
133.  Id. art. 38(A).
134.  Id.  art.  36(C).  If  the  Presidency  Council  failed  to  agree  unanimously  on  a  PM
candidate within two weeks, however, the National  Assembly would have the right to choose
a Prime Minister, albeit by a two-thirds supermajority. Id. at art. 38(A).
135.  See Hammudi  Draft Const. (Aug. 7, 2005), supra note 56, at 20.
136.  Id.
137.  Id. at 22.
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addressing  the structure  of the  executive--one  to  be  in  effect  for the first
full  four-year  term  of  the  elected  Parliament,  and  another  to  govern
subsequently. 138
Under  the  first  framework,  the  TAL's  tripartite  Presidency  Council
remained  intact.  It  would  still  be  chosen  by  the  two-thirds  majority  of
Parliament  and  make  all  decisions  on  the  basis  of  unanimity.139  The
Presidency  Council's veto  power also  survived, although  it could  now be
overridden by  a three-fifths,  instead of two-thirds,  majority. 140  There  was
no  specified  presidential  role,  however,  in  appointing  Supreme  Court
judges.141  The  National  Assembly  would  still  choose  the  Presidency
Council,  but the  Presidency  was  required  to  approve  the nominee  of the
largest  parliamentary  bloc  as  Prime  Minister.142  While  this  provision
eliminated  the discretion in choosing  the Prime Minister existing under the
TAL,  it was nonetheless  widely expected  that the  Presidency  Council  and
Prime  Minister  would  be  negotiated  as  a  package,  with  the  two-thirds
requirement  for choosing the Presidency effectively  giving all communities
leverage  over the nomination of the  Prime Minister  by the largest political
bloc.
143
In the second framework,  which will  take effect beginning  in  2010,  the
constitution  abolishes the Presidency Council  in favor of a single President
(and  a  Vice  President  with  virtually  no  constitutional  authority  of  his
own). 144  The  President  in  this  framework  is  truly  a  figurehead,  without
veto  power  or any  authority  over  appointments.  While  the  constitution
stipulates that the President must be chosen by a two-thirds majority, it also
declares  that if no  candidate receives  such  a majority  in the first ballot, a
simple  majority vote  of the  National  Assembly  is  sufficient to put  him in
office. 145  This provision,  coupled with the requirement  that the President
charge  the  nominee  of the  largest  parliamentary  bloc  with  the  task  of
forming  a  government  as  Prime  Minister,  effectively  takes  away  the
138.  See  Iraq  Const.  arts.  63-72,  134.  While  the  underlying  political  dynamic  (Shi'i
Islamists versus  Kurds,  secular Arabs, and others) drove this compromise,  there is  no doubt
that it also had much to do with the personalities  involved.  In particular, Iraqi President Jalal
Talabani,  a  Kurd  who  was  widely  expected  to  retain  his  post  under  the  permanent
constitution,  refused to accept too severe  a diminution of the presidential role  set forth in the
TAL.  Talabani, who at the time was in his early seventies,  only  expected to  serve a single
term as President under the permanent constitution.
139.  See id. art.  134(2) & (4).
140.  Id. art. 134(5).
141.  See id.  arts. 89 &  134(1).
142.  Id. arts. 67, 73,  134(1).
143.  This  is  in  fact  how  the  negotiations  developed  following  Iraq's  second  set  of
elections  on  December  15,  2005.  After  the  UIA  renominated  Ibrahim  Jaafari  as  Prime
Minister,  Kurdish  and  Sunni representatives  refused  to  approve  his appointment.  Without
their  support,  Jaafari  failed  to  build  the  necessary  support  of two-thirds  of the  National
Assembly,  and  the  UIA  was  forced  to  replace  him  with  Nuri  al-Maliki,  a  compromise
candidate acceptable to the other factions.
144.  Iraq Const. arts. 63, 66.
145.  Id. art. 67.FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
supermajority  requirements  for government  formation  that had  permeated
both the TAL and the first executive framework.146
The  constitutional  settlement  on  executive  structure  is  extremely
important,  as  it  marks  significant  progress  towards  the  Shi'i  Islamist
objective  of majoritarian,  parliamentary  supremacy.  By  taking  away  the
formidable  leverage in the government formation negotiations  now enjoyed
by  the  Kurds,  Sunni  Arabs  and  other  minority  blocs,  it  has  significant
potential to enhance the power of the Shi'i Islamist parties-so long as they
continue to win a majority of votes in national elections.
D.  Federalism
The  most  contentious  feature  of the  Iraqi  constitutional  deliberations
concerned federalism.  The TAL had recognized  the long-standing reality of
Kurdish  quasi-autonomy  in  Northern  Iraq,  formally  legitimating  the
Kurdistan Regional Government  (KRG) as the local authority governing the
northern provinces of Arbil, Sulaimaniya, and Dohuk. 147  The TAL had also
ensured that while the KRG  could  exercise  significant local  authority,  the
national  government  would  retain  full  control  over  foreign  and  defense
policy,  fiscal  and  monetary policy,  and  oil  resources. 148  At the time,  the
TAL  settlement  was  accepted  by  IGC  members  who  had  come  to
sympathize  with Kurdish  demands  for  autonomy  in  the  opposition period
before  the  war,  and  who  in  many  cases  had  begun  to  advocate
decentralization  for the rest  of Iraq. 149  It was  viewed  with  much  greater
skepticism,  however,  by  the  broader  Iraqi  society-much  of which  saw
federalism  as  an  effort by  the  Kurds  to  promote  the  disintegration  of the
Iraqi state. 
1 50
By  the  summer  of 2005,  however,  the  battle  lines  on  federalism  had
changed  considerably.  The  official  position  of  the  Shi'i  Islamists  had
shifted from  passive acquiescence  to the  status  quo regarding  Kurdistan  to
an  affirmative  desire  to  create  quasi-autonomous  federal  regions  of their
own.  The  most  striking evidence  of this  new outlook  was the  aggressive
position  taken  by  SCIRI  leader  'Abd  al-'Aziz  al-Hakim,  who  publicly
called for the creation of a nine-province  Shi'i region in  Southern  Iraq  on
August  11.151  Many of Hakim's  Shi'i coalition  partners  remained  highly
skeptical  of federalism;  nonetheless,  they went along with Hakim's call  for
the  Iraqi  constitution  to  allow  for  the  development  of  new  regional
146.  Id.  art. 73(1).
147.  TAL art. 53.
148.  Id. art.  25, 54.
149.  See,  e.g.,  Visser, supra note  9,  at  140-44;  Democratic  Principles  Working  Group,
supra note  22,  at  91-94;  Iraq  Found.,  Declaration  of the  Shi'i  of Iraq  (July  15,  2002),
http://www.iraqfoundation.org/news/2002/gjuly/15_declarationenglish.html.
150.  On the broader Arab opposition  to federalism,  see Int'l Crisis Group, supra note 44,
at 17-22.
151.  Liz Sly, Shiite Wants Autonomous Region, Chi. Trib., Aug.  12,  2005, at 8.
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governments  outside of Kurdistan.152  The Shi'i embrace  of federalism and
the proposal to create new regions outraged the  Sunni Arab members of the
Constitutional Drafting Committee.  Indeed, the Sunnis spent virtually all of
their limited political capital in the negotiations  on trying to resist the Shi'i
push for federalism, which they feared would lead to a de facto partition of
Iraq and leave Sunni-dominated  areas of the country without oil resources.
In  the  end,  the  Iraqi  constitution  established  the  right  of  individual
governorates  to  combine  with  one  another  to  form  new  federal  regions,
which in turn could exercise expansive  authorities equivalent to those of the
Kurdistan  Regional  Government. 153  This was a  clear defeat  for the Sunni
negotiators and probably formed the basis for widespread Sunni rejection of
the constitution in the subsequent referendum. 1 54
The  federalism  settlement  relates  to  the  role  of  Islam  in  Iraq's
constitutional  order  in two  important  ways.  First,  support  for  federalism
was  a  core  element  of the  broader  Shi'i-Kurd  understanding  that  drove
Iraq's constitutional  discussions from the  early  1990s through the adoption
of the permanent constitution in 2005.  For the Kurds, federalism is the  sine
qua non  of participation  in  a unified  Iraqi  state.  Any  Shi'i  effort  to roll
back Kurdish autonomy in Northern Iraq would have unraveled the political
consensus  that had united the  Iraqi  opposition  and enabled  the passage  of
the TAL.  Instead, the Shi'is and Kurds  struck a strategic bargain  in which
Shi'i  concessions  to  Kurdish  autonomy  were  matched  by  a  Kurdish
willingness  to  allow  the  Islamists  a  freer  hand  outside  of Northern  Iraq.
While this  arrangement  did not  preclude  tough  bargaining  between  Shi'i
Islamists  and  Kurds  on  all  the  issues  discussed  above,  it  also provided  a
general  set  of parameters  constraining  the  debate  and  range  of possible
outcomes.  Ultimately, the Shi'i-Kurd understanding on federalism allowed
a larger role  for Islam at the national level  than might otherwise have been
possible.
The federalism provisions of the final constitution also have the potential
to  channel  Islamist  political  energy  towards  regional  and  local  levels  of
government.  If one  or more  new regional  governments  are  formed  in the
152.  For  a  broader  examination  of the  diversity  in  Shi'i  clerical  and  political  views
towards  federalism,  see generally Visser, supra note 9.  It is likely that unified Shi'i  support
for Hakim's  general  demands  (if not  for  his  specific  proposal  for  a  nine-province  Shi'i
region)  stemmed  from  a  larger  sense  of  Shi'i  solidarity,  especially  vis-A-vis  the  other
factions.  Throughout  the negotiations,  SCIRI leaders  explained  their  demands  in terms  of
the  need to reach  parity with  the Kurds  (i.e.,  the right to form  self-governing  regions  with
expansive  authorities)  and  to  prevent  the  Sunnis  from  vetoing  legitimate  Shi'i  demands.
Indeed, given the historical opposition to federalism of such key  Shi'i factions as the Da'wa
Party  and the  Sadrist  movement,  both  of which were  heavily  represented  in the  UIA,  it is
somewhat mystifying that they never sought to make common  cause with  the Sunni  Arabs,
with whom they shared  a negative attitude toward federalism.
153.  Iraq Const. arts. 112-17.
154.  Sunni  hopes  for  rectifying  the  final  settlement  now  lie  with  the  Constitutional
Review  Commission to be formed by the new Iraqi Parliament,  which they hope will  place
significant restrictions  on the evolution of the federal system, in part by providing for a more
equitable division of revenues from Iraq's oil wealth.FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Shi'i South, they are likely to reflect  a more Islamist, sectarian outlook than
the federal authority in Baghdad.  At the national level, as we have seen, the
influence  of  the  Shi'i  Islamists  is  significantly  counterbalanced  by  the
Kurds  and  secular  Arabs;  Sunni  Islamists  can  also restrain  Shi'i  sectarian
impulses.  The  local  demographics  are  sharply  different,  however,  and
southern regions dominated by Shi'i Islamists would be far less constrained
by institutional mechanisms requiring cross-communal  consensus. 155
E. Judicial  Review
The  foregoing  discussion  makes  clear  that,  while  the  Iraqi  constitution
aims  to  synthesize  Islamic,  democratic,  and  liberal  values,  it  does  not
provide clear and specific guidelines for resolving potential conflicts among
them.  The  text  constrains  the  range  of  possible  constitutional
interpretations,  but  is  not  sufficiently  precise  to  answer  each  and  every
question for all time.  In many cases,  the imprecision of the final text was
not the  result of sloppy  drafting  or  carelessness,  but  rather  the  product  of
conscious  strategies  by  competing  drafters  to  defer  certain  contentious
political  issues for resolution  in the future.
For  this reason,  the mechanisms  for formal  constitutional  interpretation
are especially  important.  The Iraqi  constitution creates  a Federal Supreme
Court  to  serve  as  the  supreme  arbiter  of constitutional  matters.1 56  The
Court's  right  to  strike  down  legislation  is  implicit  in  a  host  of  key
constitutional  provisions,  including  Article  2  (prohibiting  laws
contradicting  the  principles  of  Islam,  democracy,  or  rights  and  basic
freedoms),  Article  13  (establishing  the supremacy  of the  constitution  over
all federal and regional law), and Article 90  (giving the Court itself the right
to  oversee  the  constitutionality  of statutes,  interpret  the  constitution,  and
settle  disputes  concerning  federalism). 157   The  establishment  of  an
independent  Supreme  Court,  appointed  by  the  political  authorities  and
subject to  the law, was never controversial  among Iraqi  leaders.  The  Iraqi
opposition  before  the  war  had  embraced  the  concept  of an  independent
judiciary, 158 and the TAL  had created  an independent  Supreme  Court with
the right to exercise judicial review. 159
155.  That  said,  they  would  still  be  restrained  by  the  constitution's  human-rights
guarantees.  Peter Galbraith has argued, incorrectly, that regional  law has primacy over these
federal  human-rights  protections,  due  to  constitutional  provisions allowing  regional  law to
displace  federal  law  in areas outside  of the "exclusive"  powers  of the federal government.
His  reading overlooks  both  the constitution's  supremacy  clause  and the  fact  that while the
constitution permits  regional  law to  displace  "national  legislation"  in certain  areas,  it does
not declare that such  law may supercede  the constitution itself. See Galbraith, supra note  13,
at 200; see also Iraq Const. arts.  13,  117.
156.  Iraq Const. arts.  89-91.
157.  Id. arts. 2,  13, 90.
158.  See INC Articles of  Association, supra note  17,  art.  1.
159.  See TAL art. 44.  Indeed, the TAL marked the first time  in Iraqi  history that judicial
independence  had been constitutionally protected.  Istrabadi, supra  note 43,  at 297.
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What did provoke controversy-at least in the debate over the permanent
constitution-was  the  composition  of  the  Supreme  Court,  and  the
mechanism  for  selecting  judges.  The  TAL  provisions  concerning  the
Supreme  Court had been deliberately  crafted (by Adnan Pachachi,  his chief
aide  Feisal  Amin  al-Istrabadi,  and  Salem  Chalabi)  to  ensure  the  Court's
moderation,  and  to preclude  its manipulation  by political factions. 160  The
Shi'i Islamists chose not to engage actively  in the TAL discussions over the
Court,  perhaps  because  they  sensed  that  it would not  have  time  to  make
substantive  decisions  during  the  period  the  TAL  would  be  in  effect.
According  to  TAL  Article  44,  the  Higher  Juridical  Council  (a  largely
secular body drawn  from Iraq's  leading  civil jurists) would nominate three
judges  for every  Supreme  Court vacancy. 161  The three-person  Presidency
Council  would then unanimously  fill  each  vacancy  from the nominees. 162
This approach,  which bypassed the National Assembly entirely,  biased the
selection  process  in  favor  of  experienced  civil  law  judges  capable  of
winning consensus approval across each of Iraq's major communities.
In contrast to their passivity  during the TAL judiciary  debates,  the  Shi'i
Islamists were extremely active in shaping the judicial branch established in
the  permanent  constitution.  Initially,  they  proposed  a  separate
Constitutional  Council to  sit above the Federal  Supreme  Court and concern
itself exclusively with constitutional  review. 163  Moreover,  recognizing that
the  Article  2  noncontradiction  clause  created  a  constitutional  basis  for
striking  down  laws based  on their incompatibility  with Islamic  values, the
Shi'i bloc  demanded that  at least four of the  Court's eleven seats  be filled
by shari'a  experts. 164  They also sought to strengthen  the Parliament's role
in  shaping  the  Court, both by giving  it the right to  appoint judges  and by
including  a  new,  vague  provision  declaring  that  the  Court  would  be
"answerable  before  the  National  Assembly."'165  Most  of these  initiatives
were resisted by the same coalition of Kurds,  secular Arabs, and the United
States,  all  of whom  recognized  that  the  Shi'i  proposals  were  aimed  at
promoting  greater  Islamic  and  clerical  influence  over  the  process  of
constitutional interpretation.
As  the  constitutional  talks  approached  the  late  summer  deadline,  Iraqi
negotiators  agreed to postpone some  of the most vexing  issues  concerning
the  Court.  They  decided  that  there  would  be  no  separate  Constitutional
Council,  but  that the  Supreme  Court members  would  include  "experts  in
Islamic jurisprudence"  alongside judges  and  other legal  experts. 166  They
also  agreed, however, that the size of the court and the precise mechanisms
for  appointing  its  members  would  be  determined  in  a  special  law  to  be
160.  Diamond, supra note 43, at 148-50.
161.  TAL art. 44(E).
162.  Id.
163.  Hammudi Draft Const. (Aug. 8,  2005), supra note  56, at 33.
164.  Id.
165.  Id.
166.  See Iraq Const. art. 89(2).FORDHAM  LAW REVIEW
enacted  by  a  two-thirds  supermajority  of the  National  Assembly 1 67  This
compromise  gave  the  Shi'i  Islamists  a  symbolic  victory--explicit
recognition  of the  need  for Islamic  experts  on the  Court-while  granting
other factions influence and leverage over the implementing  legislation that
would ultimately shape the Court's composition.
III.  CONCLUSION
It  is  too  early  to  tell,  as  of  this  writing,  whether  Iraq's  formally
democratic  constitutional  order  will  take  root,  much  less  prosper.  The
legacy  of dictatorship,  the difficulties of building  an Iraqi political  identity
that  bridges  ethnic  and  sectarian  divides,  and the  challenge  of defeating  a
vicious  insurgency  and averting  civil war all loom large.  Nonetheless,  it is
not  too  soon  to  draw  some  tentative  conclusions  about  the  Iraqi
constitutional  process  as  it has evolved  thus  far.  Four points  stand out  in
particular.
First,  the  Iraqi  constitution  is  a  product  of  a  political  bargain  struck
before  the  war among  the  leading  parties  of the  Iraqi  opposition.  These
parties  agreed (albeit  at a high level of generality) that  a new Iraqi regime
would embrace  Islam, democracy, pluralism, federalism, and human rights.
After  the  war,  the  former  Iraqi  oppositionists  returned  home  to  their
country,  and proceeded  to  implement their  political vision.168  They  were
only  able  to  do  so,  however,  because  the  program  devised  in  exile  was
generally  amenable to the broad  mass of Iraqi  society, which was  eager to
replace  the brutal  dictatorship  of Saddam  Hussein  with  a more  moderate
and democratic  regime.  Above all, however, their vision was  supported by
the  Shi'i  clerical  leadership,  and  in  particular  Grand  Ayatollah  Sistani,
167.  Id.
168.  Some have  argued that the formerly exiled Iraqi oppositionists are somehow devoid
of democratic political  legitimacy  by virtue  of the  long periods of time many spent outside
the country.  While this argument may have been plausible in March 2003,  that is no longer
the  case  today.  Indeed,  the  former exiles  have  now  triumphed  in two  sets of democratic
elections, and have  drafted a constitution  that won the approval  of seventy-eight  percent of
Iraqi  voters.  Former  exiles-and  especially  Hakim,  Jaafari,  and  'Allawi--consistently
receive high ratings  in Iraqi  opinion polls, and the Islamist  exiles in particular have enjoyed
such public  support since the very beginning  of the post-Saddam  Hussein era.  As tempting
as  it  may be for  some international  commentators to dismiss Iraq's leading  Shi'i politicians
as "out of touch with popular sentiment," see Int'l Crisis Group, supra note 50,  at  11,  these
assessments  simply fly  in the face of virtually any fair measure of Iraqi public opinion.  For
criticisms along these lines, see id. at 11; Pollack, supra note 31,  at 54-55.  For a sampling of
the  public  opinion  polls,  see Robin  Wright,  Religious Leaders Ahead in Iraq Poll,  Wash.
Post, Oct. 22,  2004, at Al; Int'l Republican  Inst.,  Survey of Iraqi Public Opinion  18,  25-26
(July 2005), available at http://www.iri.org/pdfs/08-10-05-Iraq%20poll%20presentation.ppt;
Int'l  Republican  Inst.,  Survey  of  Iraqi  Public  Opinion  23  (Jan.  2005),  available at
http://www.iri.org/pdfs/1-29-05%20poll%20presentation.ppt;  Office  of  Research  Opinion
Analysis, Dep't of State,  Iraqi  Public Has Wide-Ranging  Preferences  for a  Future  Political
System,  (Oct.  21,  2003),  available  at  http://www.cpa-
iraq.org/government/politicaLpoll.pdf.  For a defense  of the legitimacy  of the Iraqi political
class,  see Galbraith, supra note  13,  at 122-24.
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whose  democratic  fatwa  in  June  2004  powerfully  endorsed  the
compatibility of Islam and democracy.
Second,  despite  consensus  on  overarching  political  principles,  Iraqi
politicians  engaged  in  a  series  of  tough  debates  concerning  the
implementation  of  these  ideas-both  in  the  TAL  and  permanent
constitution.  These  debates  pitted  a united  Shi'i  Islamist  bloc  against  a
looser coalition of Kurds,  secular Arab  nationalists,  and the United  States.
As  the  constitutional  process  became  more  democratic-particularly
following  the  historic  Iraqi  election  of  January  30,  2005-the  Shi'i
Islamists  grew  stronger,  and  were  able  to  tilt  constitutional  outcomes  in
their  favor.  That  said,  no  single  group  was  capable  of dominating  the
process  unilaterally,  and  all  sides  made  important  concessions  and
compromises  in the course of the negotiations.  The intensity of the debates,
however,  makes  clear  that-while  there  may  now  be  a  constitutional
agreement-there  is not yet a fundamental consensus  on the extent to which
Islamic politics will play a role in Iraq's emerging democratic order.
Third, there is no question that the United  States played an important role
in  Iraq's  constitutional  process.  Beyond  the  American  military  role  in
deposing  Saddam  Hussein,  U.S.  diplomats  were  also  instrumental  in
defining the procedures  and mechanisms  for adopting  a permanent  charter,
shaping the TAL, and helping to broker agreements on difficult issues in the
final  negotiations.  Nonetheless,  it is  important  not to overstate  American
influence  in  shaping  the  substantive  constitutional  outcome,  particularly
regarding  the  role  of Islam. 169  For the  most  part,  the  U.S.  role  was  in
facilitating,  not  imposing,  constitutional  compromises-usually  at  the
initiative  of the  Iraqi players  themselves.  While  it is  true that  America's
stated goals in Iraq  included  the construction  of a democratic  regime,  it is
no less true that this goal was shared by the Iraqi political class and the vast
majority  of Iraqi  citizens.  And  when American  objectives  differed  from
those of the Iraqis with regard to constitutional  outcomes-most  obviously
with  regard  to  the  role  of religion-the  Iraqi  consensus  was  ultimately
dispositive.  Indeed,  if before  the  war  the  Bush  Administration  had been
told  that  the  final  Iraqi  constitution  would  formally  prohibit  any  law
contradicting  Islam (or rehabilitate  shari  'a as an  option for personal-status
law, or require Islamic experts to serve  on Iraq's  Supreme  Court),  it would
have been very surprised indeed.170
Finally,  it is  important  to recognize  that Iraq's  constitutional  process  is
not yet over,  despite the formal ratification of a final text  in October 2005.
The  Iraqi  constitution  allows  for  a  wide  range  of  interpretations  and
169.  For  examples  of such  overstatements,  see  Galbraith,  supra note  13,  at  139-40;
William  R.  Polk,  Understanding  Iraq:  The  Whole  Sweep  of Iraqi  History  from  Genghis
Khan's  Mongols to  the Ottoman Turks to the British Mandate  to the American  Occupation
180-81  (2005);  Andrew Arato, Interim Imposition, 18 Ethics & Int'l Aff.  25, 25-50 (2004).
170.  One  of the  authors,  writing  in  the  prewar  period,  emphasized  the  likelihood  of
Islamic democracy emerging in any Arab  state undergoing rapid democratization.  See Noah
Feldman, After Jihad:  America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy (2003).FORDHAMLAWREVIEW
political  outcomes.  Its provisions  are frequently  indeterminate,  containing
numerous  points  of  internal  tension  and  ambiguity,  especially  in  its
approach  to  integrating Islamic  values  with  liberal  provisions  on  equality
and  human  rights.  The  text  also  allows  for  considerable  constitutional
development  through  ordinary  legislation,  the  composition  of the  Federal
Supreme Court,  and the evolution of Iraq's  federal  system.  Moreover,  it is
possible that the Constitutional Review  Commission, originally proposed in
an  effort  to blunt  Sunni  opposition  to  the  constitution,  will also  allow  for
substantive  adjustments  or clarifications  of various  provisions  relating  to
Islam.
While  the  constitutional  text  takes  important  steps  toward  determining
the  relationship  between  Islam and the  state,  that relationship will  also  be
shaped by the  evolution of Iraq's political party system.  Simply put, Iraqi
politics  remains  in  flux.  It is not clear  whether  the postwar  rise of ethnic
and sectarian  identity politics  will  continue,  or whether  cross-confessional
nationalist parties  will emerge  and gain traction  over time.  Nor is  it clear
whether the Shi'i Islamist parties will continue  to look beyond their internal
rivalries and disagreements  and present a unified front at the national  level.
Their  unity  to  date,  a  considerable  achievement  largely  attributable  to
Sistani's  leadership,  was  critical to  increasing  the prominence  of Islam  in
the  constitution.  And then  there  is  the emerging  class  of democratically
elected Sunni Arab leaders.  It remains to be  seen how they will fit into the
Iraqi  political  spectrum-and,  in  particular,  whether  they  will  back  Shi'i
Islamist efforts to enhance  the role  of religion in politics or make common
cause with  the Kurds and  secular  Arabs against  Shi'i sectarianism.  All of
these  political  developments will  have important  ramifications  for Islam's
ultimate place within Iraq's constitutional system.
In  short,  the  Iraqi  constitutional  process  continues,  even  after  the
successful  referendum  in October  2005.  Iraq's historic effort  to synthesize
Islam  and  democracy  will  be  shaped  as  much  by  evolving  political
conditions  as  by  the  strictures  of the  constitutional  text.  Its  success  or
failure  will  also depend  on the Iraqi  government's  ability  to  stabilize  and
secure  the  country  in  the  face  of the  ongoing  insurgency  and  sectarian
violence.  This is not to minimize  the significance  of Iraq's constitution-
only  to  recognize  that the document  itself marks not the  end, or even the
beginning  of  the  end,  but  perhaps  the  end  of  the  beginning,  of  Iraq's
democratic development.
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